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Abstract 
EXPLORING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS 
APPLIED CASE-THE RHETORICAL ETHOS OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 
By Bobby J. Antrobus, M.A. 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2005 
Major Director: Dr. James J. Kinney 
Professor, Department of English 
By exploring classical and contemporary conceptions of rhetorical ethos, this thesis 
assembles theories of analysis and then applies them in the form of rhetorical analysis of 
the rhetorical ethos exhibited by President George W. Bush in his presidential speeches. 
The theoretical investigation reveals the extensive use of the ethical appeal in all 
manner of rhetorical situations in the contemporary world but especially focuses on how 
political rhetoric has come to rely predominantly on this persuasive appeal. 
iv 
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The study examines several speeches given by President Bush and concludes that 
his success as president is attributed largely to the sophisticated rhetorical strategies 
executed by his administration, especially its construction of a presidential ethos. 
However, the inquiry also reveals a disconcerting degree of misleading and deceptive 
rhetoric, which the author argues has resulted in a serious decline in public support for 
President Bush as he approaches his sixth year in office. 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Presidential Rhetoric and Ethos 
The power to persuade, or the artful use of rhetoric, is an indispensable 
success factor for any American president. One of the primary means of persuasion is 
ethos, or the "ethical appeal," which is also often referred to as the appeal to estimable, 
worthy character or credibility. "Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any 
given case the available means of persuasion," declares Aristotle in the Rhetoric, and he 
considers the speaker's ethos, as conveyed through the totality of the speaking 
performance, "as the most effective means of persuasion" (1355~-1356"). The primacy of 
ethos as a persuasive appeal can be better understood against the backdrop of the 
Aristotelian concept of rhetoric as an art that deals with the probable or contingent-not 
with certainty, scientific fact, or the absolute. In this realm of uncertainty, opinions, and 
educated guesses, the audience especially will attempt to perceive whether the speaker is 
credible and trustworthy. The better the speaker can impress the audience with his (in 
Aristotle's time, a public speaker would have been male) competence, good character, and 
goodwill, the better he can convince the audience to accept not only his version of reality 
("worldview") but, importantly, his proposals for dealing with it. On the other hand, if the 
audience feels he is untrustworthy, incompetent, or mean-spirited, the rhetor will face 
serious difficulty in persuading them to both his point of view and proposed courses of 
action. 
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Political rhetoric deals yjth issues where exact certainty is generally impossible 
and opinions are divided. Thus the citizenry's perception of a president's ethos or character 
is crucial to his ability to persuade them to follow his lead in general but especially to 
embrace his worldview and support policies that devolve from his ideology. Moreover, 
several national trends in the U.S. have greatly increased the demands on a president to 
deploy a robust rhetorical strategy. First, society has become so highly diverse, pluralistic, 
and heterogeneous that finding common ground or values is increasingly difficult. Office 
holders must wrestle with value conflicts, a shortage of resources, and nearly intractable 
problems as they attempt to address the major issues of the day. Second, as the average 
citizen tries to comprehend highly complex issues, they can become overtaxed by the 
amount of raw information and number of opinions that are churned out daily within our 
media-saturated world. As a result of these two factors, political majority-building on the 
basis of policy deliberation is difficult and tests not only the leadership but also the 
communication skills of the president and the executive branch. Third, partially in reaction 
to the preceding two circumstances, the modern presidency has taken over nearly the entire 
role of setting the national agenda and marshalling the public and the institutions of 
government to support it, as claimed by Jeffrey K. Tulis in his book The Rhetorical 
Presidency (145- 147). 
From this discourse, two basic terms arise. The term "the rhetorical presidency" 
speaks to the historical expansion of the presidency's national leadership role vis-8-vis the 
Congress, an enlargement that demands a requisite increase in the exercise of the power of 
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persuasion, that is, the effective use of "presidential rhetoric," to achieve success in today's 
environment of governance. 
Each president, with the aid of his political handlers, sets his own rhetorical style 
and tone; to be sure, in the administration of George W. Bush, this component of 
governing strategy takes a back seat to nothing. Ironically, while some pundits ridicule 
Bush as a stumbling, clumsy speaker, he leads a White House communications apparatus 
that produces highly sophisticated rhetoric. Moreover, by most accounts, President Bush 
and his team have enjoyed a considerable degree of success in the critical area of 
presidential rhetoric, having persuaded the Congress to pass several pieces of landmark 
legislation and having persuaded sufficient numbers of voters to reelect him to a second 
term in 2004. 
Bush's rhetoric, however, falls within the context of a rhetorical tradition that 
stretches back twenty-five-hundred years to its origin with pre-Socratic Sophists in ancient 
Greece, a history which includes an enduring debate about whether rhetoric is helpful or 
harmful, inherently evil or simply an amoral tool that a rhetor can use for good or bad 
based on her own choices flowing from her own motives. On opposing sides of this divide, 
for example, were the classicists Aristotle and Quintilian. In fourth-century B.C.E. Greece, 
Aristotle advocated a pragmatic rhetoric that allows for "the ends justify the means" 
approach, whereas in first-century C.E. Rome, Quintilian argued for the virtuous "good 
man who speaks well." 
Drawing from this rich tradition, this inquiry asks several key questions about 
Bush's rhetoric. What are the mainstays of Bush's rhetoric in the pivotal area of ethos? 
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What approaches and techniques has he used in order to persuade the populace on the basis 
of character and other key aspects of the ethical appeal? How does he use either pathos 
(appeal to the emotions of the audience) or logos (appeal to logic) to complement or 
bolster his ethos? Is his ethos genuine or fabricated? Is he trustworthy? Where does Bush 
fall in the long-standing debate about the moral use of rhetoric? How does the audience, 
the American people, respond to his rhetoric? 
To answer these questions, I analyze several of Bush's speeches on the basis of 
classical and contemporary theories of persuasion as well as research findings of other 
experts. Also, I strip the veneer of rhetoric from several policy initiatives in order to view 
the reality of what his administration has actually done. My primary conclusion is 
threefold. One, in his extensive speaking schedule, Bush skillfully employs rhetorical 
devices to build identification with the American audience on the basis of shared values 
and common heritage, including an appearance of goodwill and sincerity about any topic 
that he addresses. Two, before 911 1, Bush primarily employed a broad rhetorical strategy 
that emphasized a presidential ethos of good character, moral values, and honor and 
dignity-an ethos that is cleverly constructed through language and image management. 
Three, after 911 1, while continuing his predominant emphasis of the ethical appeal, Bush 
adopts a one-two punch of pathos and ethos on matters related to war, which he leverages 
into other areas of presidential ideological action. In this model, Bush employs the 
language of the pathetic appeal to set up a negative frame of a pessimistic, dangerous, evil 
world, which engenders emotions of fear, helplessness, and dependency among 
Americans, against which he superimposes an ethos or persona of himself as a strong war 
president and moral leader who- alone knows what is right and what should be done to save 
Americans from the forces of evil in the world. As he executes these three strategies, Bush 
attempts to frame the basis of the public's consciousness or way of thinking about the 
country, the world, and his presidency. Thus, in large measure, the Bush White House is 
rhetorically constructed. Much of Bush's success, including his election and reelection, the 
election of his party's candidates, and the advance of his ideologically-driven, partisan 
political agenda and governing strategy, has flowed directly from the skillful execution of 
these rhetorical strategies. 
Last, despite the fact that Bush has built much of his electoral and governing appeal 
to the citizenry with the language and vocabulary of moral values, which falls into the 
realm of ethos, I found that Bush's rhetoric demonstrates a preponderance of Aristotelian 
pragmatism and manipulation, as opposed to the authentic, virtuous "good man who 
speaks well" advocated by Quintilian and others. 
* * * * * *  
The organization of my thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 constitutes the 
preceding introduction. In Chapter 2, I explicate classical and contemporary theories of 
how rhetors bring the quality of ethos to bear in the process of persuasion, particularly in 
the political arena. Next, in Chapter 3, I apply theories of ethos in the form of rhetorical 
analyses of several of Bush's speeches and briefly describe communications approaches 
within his administration. Then, in Chapter 4, by examining several key policy outcomes 
and gauging audience response, I provide a reality check on Bush's rhetoric. Finally, in 
Chapter 5, I offer conclusions. 
CHAPTER 2 
Theories of Analysis: Ethos in the Age of the Rhetoric of Manipulation 
Robert J. Connors and Edward P. J. Corbett in Classical Rhetoric for the Modern 
Student call the ethical appeal the "hidden persuader" in the contemporary world because 
today's advanced practices of public relations, motivational psychology, advertising, and 
political communications embody a core emphasis on searching for effective stimuli and 
creating a desired image (77). Yet many of the formulations for the rhetoric of 
manipulation that has characterized American society from the middle of the twentieth 
century to the present are grounded in the theories of the classical rhetoricians, especially 
those of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) and to a lesser extent of the quintessential Roman 
orator, Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.). Although many theorists contributed to the discursive 
development of the rhetorical tradition during the past twenty-five hundred years, in this 
section I explicate relevant theories of rhetorical ethos from classical and contemporary 
theorists, which will form the basis for analysis of President Bush's rhetorical ethos in 
Chapter 3. 
To provide a larger context for this theoretical inquiry, it is useful to characterize 
communicative influence in terms of the modern conception of the rhetorical situation in 
which the speaker, audience, and subject interact together dynamically through the efficacy 
of language to effect persuasion. Of course, in the political arena, the speaker is a person 
campaigning for public office or holding such an office; the audience is the citizenry; and 
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the subject is comprised of a host of policy issues requiring government deliberation and 
decision. In terms of the role of the speaker in the process of persuasion, whether general 
or specific to the political sphere, two essential questions about motives arise. First, in the 
treatment of the subject, do the rhetor's involve a benefit for the audience as opposed 
to personal, commercial, institutional, or political gain at the expense of the audience? To 
choose her ends or objectives, the speaker taps into her personal worldview, or the way she 
frames reality (ideology), which is based on her attitudes, beliefs and values. Ends devolve 
from the motives engendered by ideology, whether personal, corporate, institutional, or 
political. Second, are the rhetor's selected means for persuading the audience ethical or 
manipulative? As this work will show, the rhetorical term and usage of "ethical appeal" 
(ethos) as opposed to the term and usage of "ethical" in the modern lexicon in a moral 
sense have two very different definitions. 
A. CLASSICAL THEORIES OF ETHOS 
Pertinent to understanding the evolution of ethos is to consider its ancient semiotic 
source. William M. Sattler explains in "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric" that 
ethos is "derived from the Greek word for custom, habit, or usage . . . and ethos, in its 
earliest signification, may be said to refer to the usages, habits, and traditions of one social 
group as distinguished from another" (55). In this connotation, ethos was involved with 
accepted and approved practice in groups or society. Sattler also compares ethos to the 
Latin word mores, the latter indicating standards of morally approved conduct, and he 
notes that mores are included in or are a subset of ethos or group character. He adds that 
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the "traits or qualities which make up ethos are of course approved and respected by the 
society in question but such traits do not necessarily have the status of [mores]," because in 
some cases ethos refers to qualities or customs that are without moral import. Thus ethos 
originally signed both moral and amoral connotations. 
Aristotle 
Sattler's conception parallels implications of ethos in ancient Greek epic poetry and 
the writings of pre-Socratic Sophists as well as of Plato (ca. 428-347 B.C.E.). Plato's 
student, Aristotle, in his encyclopedic treatise, Rhetoric, originates the rhetorical 
conception of ethos, the ethical appeal of the speaker's character and authority, by which, 
along with pathos, the emotional or pathetical appeal wrought in the minds of the 
audience, and logos, the logical appeal of proof found in the factual content of the 
message, a rhetor persuades his audience to embrace his viewpoint. Aristotle's emphasis 
on these three appeals is readily evident from his definition of rhetoric, which is, simply, 
discovering and using the available means of persuasion. Further, he reasons that the type 
of rhetoric influences the rhetor's choices within a given rhetorical context. Thus he 
divides the field of rhetoric into three general types: expediency (deliberative or political 
rhetoric), justice (forensic or judicial rhetoric), or honor (epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric). 
Within these types, the orator selects not only his specific ends or objectives for treating a 
particular subject with a specific audience but also the most effective means to persuade 
them to embrace and act on his propositions. 
According to Connors and Corbett, the "ethical appeal is especially important in 
rhetorical discourse, because here we deal with matters about which absolute certainty is 
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impossible and opinions are divided." Further, the authors recount that "Quintilian felt . . . 
deliberative [political] oratory had the most need for the ethical appeal . . ." (72). Making a 
similar claim in "Ethos Versus Persona," Roger D. Cherry relates how Aristotle suggests in 
the Rhetoric that ethos is especially important in deliberative rhetoric (3). As political 
rhetoric involves the exercise of judgment in important matters of state, generally the 
audience must feel a sense of trust in the political leader before they will assent to his 
proposition. Of course, as Aristotle posits, all three of the appeals support each other and 
collectively create persuasiveness. 
If ethos is a proof found in the character and authority of the speaker, how and 
when is it exerted? Aristotle responds that 
there are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own 
character-the three namely that induce us to believe a thing apart from any 
proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. (1378") 
Ideally, the ethical appeal is generated by how the speaker demonstrates these three 
specific dimensions within both the content and delivery of the speech. Based on 
Aristotle's pragmatism, these portrayed qualities may be authentic or fabricated for 
persuasive effect. 
Aristotle goes on to emphasize the importance of when by directly limiting this 
ethical demonstration to the actual speech performance: 
This kind of persuasion . . . should be achieved by what the speaker says, 
not by what people think of [his] character before he begins to speak. . . . 
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[He adds that] . persuasion .. is achieved by the speaker's personal character 
when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. (1356") 
Breaking down Aristotle's conception of ethos further, first, good sense (phronesis) 
can also be interpreted or understood as "practical wisdom," as Sattler holds (58). In other 
words, good sense is comprised of intelligence and good judgment that demonstrate a 
certain practical wisdom in making decisions and choosing among available alternatives. 
The appearance of good sense is essential to engendering the trust of the audience in the 
speaker's competence and judgment. 
Sattler ascribes moral virtues to the second component of the ethical appeal, good 
moral character (59). Cherry follows a similar pattern when he describes how good sense 
and good moral character work together: "As Aristotle puts it in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
'the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as moral 
virtue, for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the 
right means"' (3). Aristotelian pragmatism, however, allows this division of ethos to rest 
on the rhetor's ability simply to portray himself as virtuous, as a person of good moral 
character. 
The final personal characteristic upon which the successful ethical appeal depends 
is goodwill toward the hearers. Although the basic intent of this factor is a genuine 
friendliness toward and interest in the welfare of the audience, Cherry expands the 
definition based on the following statement of J. De Romilly: ". . . eunoia, in Greek, is 
something more than goodwill: it means approval, sympathy, and readiness to help7' (qtd. 
in Cherry 4). Further, Cherry observes that the Rhetoric emphasizes 
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eunoia [goodwill] in connection with deliberative rhetoric. For Aristotle, an 
important aspect of ethos involves assessing the characteristics of an 
audience and constructing the discourse in such a way as to portray oneself 
as embodying the same characteristics. He [Aristotle] suggests that "people 
always think well of speeches adapted to and reflecting their own character; 
and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt them and 
ourselves to our audience." (4) 
Similarly, Sattler characterizes goodwill as "an inclusive term for all respected 
qualities discerned in the speaker." The qualities the audience respects, Sattler continues, 
are those the rhetor possesses that appear to be the same as the ones they esteem, that is, he 
insists, ". . . the speaker who conforms to the ethos of the class [or group]-who likes what 
[they] like-will be highly regarded" (58-59). Referring to Aristotle's conception of ethos, 
Sattler describes the power of consciously understanding audience characteristics and 
adapting the oration to closely represent, reflect, and embrace them, to mirror and play 
them back in words and images to the listeners-to make the rhetor appear as one with the 
audience. 
In this regard, as well as encompassing his larger theorem of ethos, Aristotle argues 
for pragmatism in his own words: 
The orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech 
demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character 
look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of 
mind. Particularly in political oratory, . . . it adds much to an orator's 
influence that his-,own character should look right and that he should be 
thought to entertain the right feelings toward his hearers. . . . that the 
orator's own character should look right is particularly important in public 
speaking. (1 377b) 
To summarize Aristotelian ethos, the goal of the rhetor is to portray the three 
personal-based factors of ethos by representing herself in the speech as intelligent, 
competent, virtuous, and concerned for the welfare of the audience. Further, she adapts her 
persona and message to resemble the characteristics of the audience in order to appear as 
one of them. Her objective is to impress the audience as a person of credibility and 
trustworthiness, both as an individual and an authority figure, and thereby win support for 
her propositions. Critically, the pragmatic choices of the means of persuasion devolve from 
the rhetor's ends and reflect her motives toward the audience, which are influenced by her 
worldview, ideology, or personal interest. Thus it boils down to a speaker's choices about 
what she wants from or for the audience and how she will get it or give it. Ultimately, 
however, the success of the oration depends on whether the listeners favorably perceive the 
totality of the speaker's ethos and whether they are persuaded to embrace and act upon her 
proposed ends. 
Cicero 
Following Aristotle by just over two hundred years, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 
B.C.E.) adapted and added to Greek rhetoric to create a unique Roman model. Although 
Cicero does not use the Greek term ethos, nor a single Latin equivalent, James M. May in 
Trials of Character: The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos, describes how Cicero builds a 
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significant conception of the meaning of ethos through his repeated use of several Latin 
words to describe the ideal orator: auctoritas (conferred power, authority), gravitas 
(weight of character, seriousness), existimatio (reputation, good name), gratia (favor, 
esteem), dignitas (dignity, dignified position), res gestae (exploits, achievements, 
especially in public roles), and lenitas (restrained oratorical style). May also emphasizes 
that sociopolitical circumstances in Republican Rome create a special demand for ethos in 
rhetoric because the ruling Roman aristocrats place utmost importance on inherited noble- 
family-based-character and next to it, a strong respect for authority, which works to protect 
the privilege and ruling status of the nobility. By wielding the power of his superior 
eloquence, coupled with adopting the precepts of nobility-based character and authority, 
Cicero, of the equestrian (upper middle) class, breaks class barriers to gain the highest 
office in Rome, consul, which is comparable to the U.S. presidency (7,9, 12, 81). 
May proposes that Cicero throughout his career recognizes the power of the 
Romans' high regard for character and skillfully wields ethos in his oratory, especially in 
his professional specialty, the judicial arena. Preferring and typically taking the defense 
role, he extols the character of the judges, the client, himself, and Rome by adopting a 
fitting character-infused persona for the situation; then with deadly targeting he exploits 
and assassinates the character of adversaries. His devices are character sketches, ethical 
narratives, biographical portraits, personification, and invented dialogues, all used to 
characterize the principals in the case in such a way as to show the innocence of his clients 
or to turn the tables and prosecute the wrongdoing of his opponents. May argues that 
"Cicero's goal in presenting character in such a way is, of course, to lay a moral, or 
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'ethical,' foundation upon which to argue the probability of his defense." He adds that, for 
Cicero, when "compelling, logical proofs are lacking, proof based on character often fills 
the breach, overshadowing the real facts of the case and often becoming the focal point of 
the speech (1 64- 168). 
Cicero associates the orator's use of ethos with mild emotions or a persona of a 
restrained oratorical style (lenitas), as opposed to pathos, which embodies the stronger, 
more violent emotions. However, he often concludes an oration with an escalation of ethos 
into fiery pathos that sets the courtroom or political meeting ablaze (167). 
In his extensive writings on rhetoric, Cicero repeatedly discusses how character, 
authority, and other elements of the Roman brand of ethos should be exerted to persuade 
the audience. Sattler describes how in Cicero's early work, De Znventione, Cicero outlines 
the use of ethos in the exordium (introduction), but in his later works, De Oratore and 
Orator, Cicero adopts more of the Aristotelian precept that ethos should pervade the entire 
speech, albeit Cicero generally focuses on forensic rhetoric (61-62). Echoing Sattler, May 
describes how Cicero extols the judges, the audience, the client, himself, and Rome as a 
means to utilize ethos on the basis of conciliare, that is, to conciliate the audience, to 
overcome distrust or animosity, especially early in the speech, a conception similar to 
Aristotle's idea of portraying goodwill toward the audience (166). Although he stresses 
character within his conception of the ideal statesman-orator, nonetheless Cicero 
manipulates ethos within the Roman belief system when he deems necessary in order to 
achieve his ends and those of his clients and supporters. 
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Quintilian - - .. 
Not all major classical rhetoricians, however, adopt the premise that a speaker's 
character should privilege pragmatism or situational manipulation over virtue. For 
example, in his Institutes of Oratory, Marcus Fabius Quintilian (35-96 C.E), the Roman 
educator who is considered the last great rhetorician of the classical period, emphasizes the 
genuine integrity and moral virtue of the orator, whom he defines as the "good man skilled 
in speaking," (XII. 1. 1). Moreover, by arguing that the rhetor literally must embody the 
moral qualities of a good man in order to speak well, he postulates a causal relationship in 
terms of the essential unity of moral earnestness and effective speaking, that is, only a 
good man can produce truly good oratory. 
B. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF ETHOS 
The visionary theories of the classical Greek and Roman rhetoricians held 
significant sway among theorists and practitioners in succeeding historical eras and are still 
influential in the twenty-first century. 
Kenneth Burke 
Perhaps the most influential theorist to modify and expand, as well as augment and 
complement, classical conceptions of ethos is Kenneth Burke (1897-1993), a preeminent 
theorist of rhetoric of the 20th century. In The Rhetorical Tradition, Patricia Bizzell and 
Bruce Herzberg note how Burke develops frameworks that can be used to analyze many 
systems of knowledge, ranging from philosophy to science and from psychology to poetry 
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and popular culture-all from the - .. point of view of rhetoric (1296-97). Burke's voluminous 
works bring many new perspectives to the modern conception of ethos. 
Identification 
First is his theorem of "identification." Bizzell and Herzberg define this central 
term as "the ways in which the members of a group promote social cohesion by identifying 
with something larger and more comprehensive." Burke himself explains in A Rhetoric of 
Motives: 
The fact that an activity is capable of reduction to intrinsic, autonomous 
principles does not argue that it is free from identification with other orders 
of motivation extrinsic to it. . . . The human agent . . . is not motivated 
solely by the principles of a specialized activity, however strongly this 
specialized power . . . may affect his character. Any specialized activity 
participates in a larger unit of action. 'Identification' is a word for the 
autonomous activity's place in this wider context. . . . [For example,] the 
shepherd . . . acts for the good of the sheep, to protect them from 
discomfiture and harm. But he may be 'identified' with a project that is 
raising the sheep for market (27). 
Writing about this Burkean concept in Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, Sonja K. 
Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp observe that 
[people as social beings form] identities through various properties or 
substances, including physical objects, occupations, friends, beliefs, and 
values. As . . . [they] ally with various properties or substances [ideas, 
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beliefs, personsl, - .. . . . [they] share "substance" with whatever or whomever 
they associate. Burke uses the term "consubstantial" to describe this 
association. As two entities are united in substance through common ideas, 
attitudes, material possessions, or other properties, they are consubstantial. 
( 174) 
In Burke's usage, identification is synonymous with consubstantiality and with 
persuasion. In other words, shared substance such as beliefs and values and ideas 
constitutes identification between an individual and some other person or persons, which 
forms a basis for persuasion. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke explains that "you persuade a 
man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his." He adds that: 
Rhetoric is properly said to be grounded in opinion, . . . [but] not opinion as 
contrasted to truth. . . . [For example], you may say that a person so acted 
when the person did not so act-and if you succeed in making your 
audience believe you, you could be said to be trafficking in sheer opinion as 
contrasted with the truth. But we are here concerned with motives, . . . we 
are discussing the underlying ethical assumptions on which the entire tactics 
of persuasion are based. Here the important factor is opinion. . . . The 
rhetorician, as such, need operate only on this principle. If, in the opinion of 
a given audience, a certain kind of conduct is admirable, then a speaker 
might persuade the audience by using ideas and images that identify his 
cause with that kind of conduct. (54-55) 
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Regarding Burke's proposition ~ .. about this connection between identity and 
persuasion, Foss et a1 suggest that Burke expands the notion of rhetoric to include a change 
in audience attitude or behavior solely on the basis of identification with a rhetor (175). 
This is a stronger hypothesis than that proposed by Sattler in the earlier reference about the 
operation of ethos as conforming to class or group expectations and norms. 
These authors describe how identification can function in three basic ways. First, it 
may be used as a means to an end. For example, a candidate for office may attempt to win 
votes simply by telling an audience of farmers that he was raised on a farm. The second 
use involves the operation of antithesis, such as held by the saying, "my enemy's enemy is 
my friend," which is exemplified by how the U.S. and U.S.S.R. joined together to fight 
against a common enemy, Germany, in W.W. 11. The third use is where identification 
occurs at an subconscious level-which is often the most powerful as it goes unnoticed by 
the one persuaded. Foss gives the example of the man who buys Marlboro cigarettes by 
identifying subconsciously with the image of the "Marlboro man" in the advertisements. 
The authors add that Burke gives the example of how "to say 'that "we" are at war' 
includes under the same heading soldiers who are getting killed and speculators who hope 
to make a killing in war stocks" (174-176). In these cases, identification is diffusing subtly 
and individuals may neither be conscious of the identifications they are making nor aware 
that they are being persuaded unknowingly to adopt an attitude or take an action desired by 
another party. 
In Rhetoric and Human Consciousness: A History, Craig R. Smith concludes that 
"the power of this aspect of ethos derives from Burke's ability to trace identification back 
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to motive and motive back to-substance" (325). In other words, for members of an 
audience to identify with a speaker they must share a common set of motives. That is not 
to say that they must share precisely the same set of motives, but only that there must be a 
degree of overlap between the motives of speaker and audience that is sufficient in breath 
or depth to create the identification that leads to persuasion. 
A corollary derived from Aristotelian theory is that a speaker does not have to 
actually share motives with the audience-he may simply create an appearance or image- 
a persona-that indicates certain motives but which belies his genuine motives and 
character. "Persona" can be defined as the role or image or characterization that a person 
adopts in order to portray certain conscious intentions to people while at the same time 
concealing other intentions, attitudes, beliefs, or degree of understanding about a matter. In 
other words, an oratorical persona may be a mixture of authentic and fictitious elements- 
at the choice of the speaker. In actual practice, 6 la Cicero, it is more accurate to think in 
the plural, since the rhetor may inhabit different personae for different audiences. If and 
when the speaker attempts to occupy a persona, act out a superficial role, or model an 
appearance or image, often his purpose is to create stronger bonds and persuade the 
audience on the basis of identification. Smith holds that "the better [that speakers'] 
personae are rhetorically constructed-that is, adjusted to audience and crafted in 
language-the more likely we are to identify with them and embrace their values" (24). 
Division or Alienation; Scapegoats 
Several other important concepts related to ethos devolve from Burke's larger 
theory of identification. Hand in hand with identification are the related precepts of 
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"division" (also known as alien-ation or dissociation) and "scapegoat." Each person is 
uniquely individual, but when consubstantial with another person, he becomes joined in 
some shared value or interest with another (Foss et a1 175). In this way, rhetorical ethos is 
a tool for bridging separateness and uniting people. "'Belongingness' in this sense is 
rhetorical," declares Burke (28). He adds that "identification . . . confront[s] the 
implications of division. . . . If men were not apart from one another, there would be no 
need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity" (22). On the other hand, rhetorical ethos is 
often used to create division and alienation. Craig Smith applies Burkean concepts when 
he observes: 
For every "them," there is an "us." A speaker can divide an audience from 
"them" using strategies of alienation: "they" are different in values 
(ideology), or "they" are different in habits (culture, religion). Very 
sophisticated, and perhaps dangerous, speakers can make "them" the 
scapegoat, what Burke calls the 'vessel' of our unwanted evils or 'our 
troubles.' Using the rhetoric of the negative, speakers can symbolically or 
actually call for the sacrificing of the 'scapegoats' in order to solve 'our 
problems' or to purge 'our guilt,' thereby purifying 'our cult.' 
(322-323) 
As an example, Smith relates how Adolph Hitler powerfully used identification 
(the rhetoric of the positive) under the umbrella of propaganda to unite the German people 
in support of the Nazi regime while at the same time he used alienation (the rhetoric of the 
negative) to divide off the Jews and other ethnic groups, unite the Germans against them, 
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depict them as the cause of Gemany's problems, claim the Germans were victims, and 
make the Jews the hated scapegoat. Smith argues that through the repetitive 
communication of this dichotomous message of identification and alienation, Hitler 
subverted the moral compass of many Germans in his audiences (323). In Language as  
Symbolic Action, Burke notes that in political affairs, the situation ("scene") encompasses 
opposing views on an issue from partisan groups, which typically places great stress on a 
division between citizens. He adds, however, that the alienation can be healed or 
ameliorated by joining forces against a common enemy, such as a foreign war or major 
domestic program to promote the common welfare (5 1). 
Thus political leaders have the choice of using identification to unite (positive 
rhetoric) or to divide (negative rhetoric); the logical extension of this argument is that the 
politician can calibrate his or her rhetorical appeal to unite sufficient numbers to secure a 
simple majority in order to gain and hold office-and then use its power to enact his or her 
ideological agenda, which may include dividing away the near-majority who espouse a 
different ideology with techniques of identification, division, and scapegoating. Bizzell and 
Herzberg conclude that "Burke examines the ways in which the terms used to create 
identification work to include the members of a group in a common ideology, while at the 
same time excluding alternate terms, other groups, and competing ideologies" (1296). 
Terministic Screens 
In Language as Symbolic Action, Burke describes to the human being as a "symbol 
using animal" and emphasizes how language (symbols or written signs) is often used to 
"defeat reality" (45). He contends that "even if any given terminology is a reflection of 
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reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this 
extent it must function also as a deflection of reality" (45). Burke labels this factor 
"terministic screen," which he defines as the way certain terms screen or deflect the 
audience's attention toward or away from certain realities or ideologies. Burke proposes 
that a degree of deflection of reality occurs from "simply the fact that any nomenclature 
necessarily directs the attention into some channel rather than others" (45). Invoking such 
screens goes hand in hand with the technique of identification. Craig Smith contends that 
"our screens become projections of ourselves, and shape the ways in which we see the 
world" (330). Through the use of language, speakers may attempt to tap into these 
paradigms or worldviews held by audience members in order to build identification and 
thereby persuade them. 
Devolving from the premise of terministic screens is Burke's notion of how every 
epistemology has an "ultimate" or "god-term" that captures the fundamental essence of an 
area of human knowledge, belief, and action-as the name " G o d  does for religious 
epistemologies. However, much of the basis for Burke's premise comes from Richard M. 
Weaver, who writes in The Ethics of Rhetoric that 
by "god-term" we mean that expression about which all other expressions 
are ranked as subordinate. . . . Its force imparts to the others their lesser 
degree of force, and fixes the scale by which degrees of comparison are 
understood. (2 12) 
The concept of god-terms indicate a rank-ordering of terms, but an ultimate term is 
much more than just the most fitting or clever word in comparison to others. Weaver 
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explains that god-terms carry- an.expectation of significant human response: 
The capacity to demand sacrifice is probably the surest indicator of the "god 
term," for when a term is so sacrosanct that the material goods of this life 
must be mysteriously rendered up for it, then we feel justified in saying that 
it is in some sense ultimate. (214) 
Weaver offers "American" as an example of a god-term, while pointing out that the 
way Americans use the term could be associated with an "element of national egotism." 
The term finds expression in thoughts like "this is the American way" or "it is the 
American thing to do" (218). Importantly, it is a standard word in the vocabulary of U.S. 
political leaders when they ask for sacrifices not only for their domestic agenda but 
especially for war. 
He goes on to argue that "the counterpart of the "god term" is the "devil term," or 
"terms of repulsion," and that "'un-American' comes nearest to filling that role" (222). He 
adds that "it follows naturally that in the popular consciousness of this country, 'un- 
American' is the ultimate in negation" (219). In these examples, he shows how persuaders 
often establish a dichotomy between god- and devil-terms, such as American versus un- 
American. 
Finally, Weaver observes that 
there seems to be some obscure psychic law which compels every nation to 
have in its national imagination an enemy, . . . [the] need for a scapegoat, or 
for something which will personify "the adversary." If a nation did not have 
an enemy, an enemy would have to be invented to take care of those 
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expressions of scorn and hatred to which peoples must give vent. . . . a class 
will be chosen, or a race, or a type, or a political faction, and this will be 
held up to a practically standardized form of repudiation. (222) 
In the political arena, politicians incorporate a jargon of god-terms as a means of 
identification and persuasion. On the other hand, they may label opposing parties, factions, 
countries, and the like with the negative rhetoric of devil-terms, terms of repulsion, that 
identify the odious or reprehensible beliefs and behaviors of competing groups or 
ideologies, which they desire to dominate, control, thwart, eradicate-or just make 
themselves appear good by way of comparison. For example, liberals may assign repulsive 
terms to far-right conservatives and to their political agenda, and conservatives may try to 
appropriate the terms "Christian" or "Christian values" to their cause. Returning to Burke, 
who expands upon Weaver's theories of ultimate terms, Bizzell and Herzberg conclude 
that Burke sees such terms and the language systems that envelop them as key resources 
for rhetorical strategizing and action (1296). 
Introducing another form of a terministic screen, Renana Brooks, in "A Nation of 
Victims: Bush Uses Well-Known Linguistic Techniques to Make Citizens Feel 
Dependent," writes about the common device that she calls "empty language." She argues 
that this technique provides an easy and slick way for a speaker not only to control the 
terms of debate but also to exert dominance over the audience. She proposes that empty 
language 
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is like empty calories. Just as we seldom question the content of potato 
chips while enjoying the pleasurable taste, recipients of empty language are 
usually distracted from examining the content of what they are hearing. 
Dominators use empty language to conceal faulty generalizations; to 
ridicule viable alternatives; to attribute negative motivations to others, thus 
making them appear contemptible; and to rename and 'reframe' opposing 
viewpoints. (20) 
She gives the example of how President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union 
speech, on the issue of tort reform reduces the proof of the alleged causal relationship 
between malpractice insurance and skyrocketing healthcare costs to "No one has ever been 
healed by a frivolous lawsuit" (20). This statement begs several questions. Where is the 
explanation? Where is the rationale? Where is the analysis? Where is the proof? This kind 
of language screens audience attention to a meaningless catch-phrase while it obfuscates 
any honest, intelligent, open discussion of the facts or circumstances of the issue. 
Definition; Redefinition 
Within the context of Burke's concept of terministic screens, as part of the larger 
topic of language use in rhetoric, Craig Smith discusses the concept of "definition." He 
refers to the practice of many politicians who spend more effort defining their opponent 
than their own policy platforms and values, and he concurs with Kathryn Olson, who 
declared that "a rhetor using a definition is not merely presenting an undisputed concept, 
but is advocating adherence to the particular definition and the perspective sponsoring it" 
(qtd. in Craig Smith 331). Another rhetorician, Chaim Perelman (1912-1984), in .the essay 
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"The New Rhetoric: A Theory o f  Practical Reasoning," theorizes parallel to Burke, 
Weaver, Smith, and Olson when he states: 
Definitions . . . in argumentation, . . . determine the choice of one particular 
meaning over others. . . . Definition is regarded as a rhetorical figure-the 
oratorical definition-when it aims, not at clarifying the meaning of an idea, 
but at stressing aspects that will produce the persuasive effect that is sought. 
It is a figure relating to choice: the selection of facts brought to the fore in 
the definition is unusual because the definiens is not serving the purpose of 
giving the meaning of the term. (291-292) 
As an example, Craig Smith describes how in the 1988 election, then Vice 
President George H. W. Bush successfully redefined Governor Michael Dukakis, after 
Dukakis gave a very vague acceptance speech at the Democratic convention that August- 
which gave Bush I strategists an opening. Bush I defined Dukakis' position for him-pro 
gun control, light on the death penalty, pro-abortion, pro-taxes, membership in the ACLU 
and the like. Smith insists that Dukakis "accepted Bush 1's 'terministic' screen [i.e., 
baiting] and agreed to confront Bush I on Bush 1's terms" (330). The result is history. 
Definition also includes the concept of redefinition. Smith proposes that 
"transformational redefinition" changes the boundaries of a dispute whereas 
"transcendental redefinition" occurs when elements of opposing sides are blended to 
overcome differences or when a redefinition uses ambiguity to overcome division. An 
example of the latter was President Richard Nixon's "peace with honor" slogan for ending 
America's military involvement in Vietnam. Under the same general heading of definition, 
Smith holds that the "strategic use of language often leads to what Burke calls 
'pontificating thirds,' that is, third terms that are added to the two terms of the polarity to 
effect denial of one side, denial of a polarity, or to effect compromise or transcendence. 
Again, Nixon's "peace with honor" phrase exemplifies this technique as does a point from 
a 1964 speech by Ronald Reagan in which he said, "There is no left or right, there is only 
an up or down." Such usage attempts to create by simple rhetorical definition a "higher 
synthesis" based on what Weaver and Burke call an "ultimate term" (331). 
Subliminal Symbology 
Craig Smith explains how Burke, in his 1941 book, The Philosophy of Literary 
Form, explores symbolic action. He observes that Burke "argues that dialectics exist in 
almost all communication and that they are often subliminal. To expose them, a critic must 
examine the symbolic action, such as imagery, which takes place in a speech because it 
may reveal what is going on ideologically" (316). Smith adds that Burke is proposing that 
the speaker often uses imagery in this context as a means to convey symbolic meaning at a 
subliminal level, which is another aspect of Burke's concept of identification. 
Smith illustrates how this construct of symbolism was successfully used in a 
nationally televised speech given by Ronald Reagan in 1964 on behalf of the Republican 
presidential candidate, Senator Barry Goldwater. First, Reagan establishes a dichotomy 
through the manipulation of images: "up" is "good" and "up" is "us" or "we," whereas 
"down" is "bad" and "down" is "they" or "them." Then he creates identification by 
dividing various images between the two, for example, "private enterprise" is "up" and 
"big government" is "down," linking the images to values that supplement the ideological 
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basis of the message. Going further, Reagan tags the two sides with god- and devil-terms. 
For example, he describes "government handouts" with the devil term "temptation." 
Second, Reagan uses imagery to reinforce the message by localizing ideas, bringing them 
into immediate focus for the audience. In the picture he paints, the government is seen as 
"'laying its hand . . . tends to grow and take on weight,'. . . and begins to 'hold life-and- 
death power."' Smith asserts that "Reagan's objective is to alienate his audience from its 
government so the audience will support the conservative candidacy of Goldwater, which 
is committed to reducing the size of the federal government." Third, he explains how 
Reagan uses the imagery to persuade the audience to his point of view or at least to make 
them receptive to his message, to his ideology, to everything on his side of the dichotomy. 
The author concludes that "since Reagan's imagery says symbolically what the speech says 
ideologically, it reinforces the message of the address and explains its success" (3 18-3 19). 
Rhetorical Form 
Craig Smith reasons that Burke, in Counter-Statement, "built on the Greek notion 
of kairos (fitting timing) and the Roman notion of decorum (meeting expectations) by 
arguing that form arouses and fulfills desires and expectations" (3 13). In A Rhetoric of 
Motives, Burke argues that the audience feels exalted when they feel a sense of 
collaborating in an assertion or idea set forth in a speech. He affirms that "at least, we 
know that many purely formal patterns can readily awaken an attitude of collaborative 
expectancy in us," and he explains how form can be used to involve the audience in a 
collaborative way with the orator (58). In his example, the device of climax (gradation) is 
used for political import in the Berlin crisis of 1948: "Who controls Berlin, controls 
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Germany; who controls Germany controls Europe; who controls Europe controls the 
wor ld  (58). Although this proposition may or may not be true, Burke explains that by the 
time the listener arrives at the second of the three stages, the listener already senses how it 
is destined to conclude-and mentally collaborates to round out its symmetry of form and 
complete the utterance-which constitutes a measure of assent. In other words, the form of 
the message has captured not only the auditor's attention but also his involvement, and 
assent to the form subtly, even subconsciously, invites assent to the proposition in the 
statement. Burke concludes that "[thus] we . . . establish the principle . . . [that] these 
rhetorical forms would involve 'identification,' first by inducing the auditor to participate 
in the form, as a 'universal' locus of appeal, and next by trying to include a partisan 
statement within the same pale of assent" (59). In their book Power Persuasion: Moving 
an Ancient Art into the Media Age, Mary Rose Williams and Martha D. Cooper suggest 
that "audiences have a strong psychological need to see form 'played out' or completed" 
(1 13). Thus by the skillful use of form, which builds psychological anticipation in the 
hearers' minds and then gratifies it, the speaker can build audience participation, which 
leads to identification and assent to propositions. 
Mary Rose Williams and Martha D. Cooper 
The preceding paragraph references these authors in regard to the power of form to 
persuade. However, their treatise, Power Persuasion, contributes many insights to the 
study of persuasion and the ethical appeal in the contemporary context. 
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Comparison to Aristotelian Good Sense, Good Moral Character, and Goodwill 
Whereas Aristotle proposes that the audience's perception of ethos or character 
results from the rhetor's portrayal of good sense, good moral character, and goodwill 
within the specific speech pegormance, Williams and Cooper submit that "not all 
contemporary research agrees that character only matters insofar as it is strategically 
exploited in the persuasive message itself' (87). Thus they agree with the classicist, 
Cicero, that the speaker's past reputation is also a factor in the audience's assessment of an 
orator's credibility in the current rhetorical situation. 
Somewhat troubling, in contrast to another classical tenet, these authors discovered 
from their research that reasoning from evidence and discussing both sides of an issue do 
not seem to aid the audience's perception of competence (good sense) in a speaker. 
Another difference they point out is that good moral character has been reduced to a 
general sense of trust or trustworthiness in today's contemporary world (90). 
To Aristotle's three personal-based characteristics of ethical appeal, Williams and 
Cooper add the personal characteristic of dynamism, which they relate to the speaker's 
delivery and bearing, to an appearance of being "interesting, strong, aggressive and active" 
(91). Similarly, Martin E. P. Seligman, a psychologist and professor well-known for his 
bestseller, Learned Optimism, correlates winning presidential elections with the personal 
factor of "sounding optimistic." With the help of one of his graduate students at the 
University of Pennsylvania, Harold Zullow, Seligman analyzed nomination acceptance 
speeches by Democratic and Republican presidential candidates and found that 
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in the twenty-two presidential elections from 1900 through 1984, 
Americans chose the more optimistic-sounding candidate eighteen times 
[82 percent]. In all elections in which an underdog pulled off an upset, he 
was the more optimistic candidate. The margin of victory was very strongly 
related to the margin in pessmm', with landslides won by candidates who 
were much more optimistic than their opponents. (192) 
The two researchers went on to predict in the fall of 1988 that, based on the 
application of their optimism models to the candidate's nomination speeches, Vice 
President George H.W. Bush would beat Governor Michael Dukakis by 9.2 percent in 
1988. He won by 8.2 percent. Using the same modeling techniques to predict who would 
win the thirty-three Senate races in 1988, but applied in this case generally to speeches 
announcing their senatorial candidacies, they called 86 percent of the races correctly (197- 
198). Thus the appearance of personal dynamism, including its core element of can-do 
optimism, has proven ethical-and electoral-appeal. 
Symbols 
Earlier, it was noted that Burke characterizes the human being as "the symbol-using 
animal." Williams and Cooper place most of Burke's theories under their "symbolist 
perspective" of rhetoric and propose that 
1 Seligman coined "pessrum" to represent an analytical score of a candidate's optimism-pessimism profile. It 
incorporates measures of pessimism and rumination (hence "pessrum") as well as optimism and action- 
orientation. The higher the pessrum score, the worse the candidate's style, that is, the lower his or her 
optimism index (1 89). 
32 
persuasion is the process by which we become motivated to act or believe 
in a particular way through our communication with others, as a product of 
our own human inclination to interact with symbols together with the form 
and structure of the symbolic messages to which we are exposed. . . . 
Symbols are words, objects, or actions that come to represent something 
else." (108-109) 
One of the best known symbols is the American flag, which represents many 
important ideals and remembrances central to our version of patriotism. For example, it 
calls to mind such diverse ideas as the millions who have served America, the 
Constitution, the principles of law, and liberty and equality, to name only a few. Further, 
they propose that identification, rhetorical form and verbal content (language), along with 
nonverbal symbols and constructed media images, all interact and comprise the very real 
"symbolic world" that exists side by side with the "empirical world" comprehended by 
human sensory perception. In the empirical world, "objects move, have texture, make noise 
and cause pain or ease hunger," whereas in the symbolic world, "conceptual connections 
form the associations . . . [and] shape our human response to situations just as surely as do 
the physical and empirical connections." Both of these worlds affect or provide inputs to 
the process by which the human mind determines reality. Moreover, an argument could be 
made that in today's world of ideas and images bombarding human consciousness 2417 
from a competition-driven media coupled with near virtual reality, the importance of the 
symbolic world supersedes that of the empirical world in the thinking of many Americans 
(120). 
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Exploring nonverbal symbols further, Williams and Cooper cite research by scholar 
Ray Birdwhistell that 65 percent or more of meaning is the product of nonverbal elements 
of the conversation. They argue that nonverbal symbols like emblems and icons have 
developed conventionalized meanings. For example, the visual image of a mushroom 
cloud commorily symbolizes nuclear war. The authors also explain how symbols not only 
function "instrumentally," such as the knife-and-fork sign for a restaurant in the airport, 
but they also "hold powerful potential for identification, . . . [that] evoke[s] powerful 
motives and interests," such as the religious symbol of the crucifix or the political symbol 
of the Statute of Liberty. Based on a statement by Burke that "symbols are verbal parallels 
of experience" (qtd. in Williams and Cooper 162), these theorists maintain that "it is fair to 
add that symbols can also be nonverbal parallels of experience, both denoting and 
connoting meanings that serve as the basis for identification.. .for example, the well-known 
photograph of the fireman in Oklahoma city holding the burned infant who died in the 
explosion of the federal building there in 1995. . . ." Further, they submit that "many 
people may identify themselves as belonging to a particular generation, reference group or 
culture" through selective nonverbal symbols (162). For example, to an aging soldier of the 
Vietnam era, the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington, D.C., may connote honor to 
the dead and legitimacy and acceptance of the efforts of those who fought (161). 
Perhaps "constructed images" are of the greatest impact among all symbols in 
today's world. Williams and Cooper catalog the more predominant ones, ranging from the 
translation of "complicated statistics into bar graphs or pie charts" in Powerpoint 
presentations, to the episode of Ronald Reagan bringing a "copy of the several-thousand- 
34 
page federal budget to Congres_s,to show them and the viewing public just how huge it 
was," to the awesome variety of images, sounds, and words, radiating from computer 
graphics, filmed scenes, TV advertisements, animation, and mixed audio tracks. The 
authors argue that these messages are strategically designed to appeal to several senses 
simultaneously and hook the viewer with synthetic, manufactured images that "are 
believable because they seem realistic," whether the TV ad with a "steaming cup of 
coffee" to which "dishwashing detergent is added so that when it is stirred it has that 
frothy, just-brewed look" or the carefully crafted political campaign TV spot showing 
voters applauding the candidate while upbeat music plays in the background, or the close- 
up shot of the model in the magazine whose face has been "airbrushed to eliminate any 
sign of wrinkles, blemishes or even skin pores." Thus constructed images "alter reality to 
present more appealing effects" and persuaders use these fictitious realities to create 
identification with audiences who see or feel that their "interests, motives and values are 
re-presented in [these] symbolic acts." 
In effect, when the persuader fabricates images that strike a "responsive chord" that 
resonates with the viewer's or listener's experience, "then all the associations that 
accompany that experience can be invoked," opening the door wide to multiple persuasive 
effects, such as conveying information, inducing moods, transferring the affect of the 
nonverbal element to the product or idea being discussed, and attracting particular target 
audiences. Williams and Cooper find that these practices that manufacture "reality- 
fictions" for ethical appeal are often in fact ethically questionable, because they distort 
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reality, subtly manipulate and heighten emotions, reduce human choice, and undermine 
respect for fundamental humanity (167-172). 
Image Management 
Building on the centrality of ethos to persuasion and the application of the 
specialized aspect of constructed images as symbols, Williams and Cooper set forth the 
principles of the modern day practice of image management, which is merely an attempt to 
construct or refurbish a speaker's ethos and continually maintain and embellish it. Most 
commonly, public relations firms are employed for such objectives. Based on the work of 
social theorist Max Weber, the authors contend that society longs for heroes and messiahs 
and that the image management industry has responded to supply the demand. But all they 
can offer up are poor substitutes-"notables" who are famous for what they achieved (even 
that outcome is questionable in many cases)-well-known public figures or celebrities 
with manufactured images (95). 
Next, based on the work of historian Daniel Boorstin, Williams and Cooper 
expound several qualities of these image-made personalities. First, the "media images are 
synthetic, the product of planning and strategic creation." For example, although Ronald 
Reagan was naturally telegenic, his image handlers took great care to place him in only 
those "situations where his aptitude would appear in the best light"4learly not a practice 
of transparency or authenticity (95). 
Second, the "media images are believable from the audience's point of view." The 
authors give the example of the McDonalds commercial that featured basketball stars Larry 
Bird and Michael Jordan making "unbelievable" shots off a bridge and across a river. But 
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there is a thread of plausibility "because of the legendary athletic prowess on the court of 
both Bird and Jordan." Image-producers create a contextual backdrop to the images that is 
at least partially if not significantly representative of the audience's conceptions of values 
and expectations, and the artificial context acts as a "frame of reference" for identification 
with the portrayed individual or corporation and their messages. But these portraits are 
fictional-mere fabrications that are foisted on viewers-even though they may be 
anchored in audience conceptualizations of expected or plausible reality (95). 
Third, "media images invite passivity and a sense of completeness." The candidates 
or causes or organizations are pawned off as near perfect, bigger-than-life ideals while they 
are but fabled imitations of heroes of earlier ages. Yet their made-up images ask the 
audience to embrace the person or organization and their worldviews, to join with them "in 
great labors and sacrifice," to vote for them, or to support the cause or buy the product 
without performing one's own due diligence or critical analysis of the ideology, 
propositions, or value of what is offered. 
Finally, Williams and Cooper propose that 
media images are vivid and concrete, often appealing to the senses. They 
are generally simplified, compared to the reality they are supposed to 
represent. Media images are supported by a catchy slogan or phrase. 
Perhaps most interesting of all, media images are ambiguous, capable of 
reinterpretation in new situations to prevent giving offense and to 
accommodate the changing needs of their creators. (95) 
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They cite the examples of product - - .. advertisements by Philip Morris and Nike that "present 
vivid and concrete images of rugged individualists or heartwarming community and family 
connections in order to suggest that the corporation represented embodies these 
characteristics" (95-96). 
The authors conclude that "image management centers upon strategic choices by 
persuaders [that are] designed to enhance them as persuaders in [the] perceptions of their 
audience" (96). Whereas classical ethos features a rhetorical situation in which a speaker 
makes direct, specific ethical appeals in-person to an audience, image management 
portrays and communicates in general themes and with abstract values, which are 
frequently not clearly tied to specific proposals, and often does so without the direct 
presence of the one whose image is being managed. Thus image management adds a new 
dimension to the discursive development of ethos-a dimension that heightens the ability 
of the persuader to, on the one hand, help and benefit more people, or on the other hand, 
manipulate reality for personal, corporate, or political gain (96). 
Charisma 
"Charisma" may be a part of an authentic ethos. Or it may be intertwined with 
image management, as some contemporary, would-be heroes try to capitalize on nationally 
recognized events or accomplishments and ride a wave of fabricated images to charismatic 
status. Williams and Cooper associate charisma with ethos when they suggest that "the 
enormous persuasive power of charisma makes it an essential concept in contemporary 
studies of persuasion that begin with the classical concept of ethos" (94). They assert that 
history contains many examples of persuaders who had bigger-than-life influence, not 
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because of the position they occupied in specific institutions of power, but because of a 
strong or forceful personality coupled with unique situational opportunity. As examples of 
charismatic leaders, they offer Ronald Reagan, Adolph Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt, Lee 
Iacocca, General Douglas McArthur, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mahatma Gandhi. The 
authors hold that charismatic persuaders seem to be able to amass nontraditional 
"extraordinary" power and to instigate "wide-sweeping change in the social or institutional 
status quo." However, as Williams and Cooper go on to show, "charisma is only charisma 
if others perceive it as such," meaning the audience's perception is ultimately deterministic 
(92). 
Other Relevant Theories 
Language Frames; Framing 
Another aspect of language that contemporary researchers associate with rhetoric 
and persuasive appeal is the "language frame" or "framing." Although I place it here in the 
organization of this work, framing is actually another subheading under Burke's theory of 
terministic screens and it is a relative of the techniques of definition and redefinition. 
In Don't Think of an Elephant!, George Lakoff relates how in his introductory 
course in cognitive linguistics at the University of California at Berkley he asks his 
students to do the following exercise: 
Don't think of an elephant. Whatever you do, do not think of an elephant. I 
have never found a student who is able to do this. Every word, like 
elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of 
knowledge. (3) 
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Don't think of an elephant-it cannot be done, of course, and that's the point. In order not 
to think of an elephant, you have to think of an elephant. Lakoff adds: 
When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame. Richard Nixon found that out 
the hard way. While under pressure to resign during the Watergate scandal, 
Nixon addressed the nation on TV. He stood before the nation and said, "I 
am not a crook." And everybody thought about him as a crook. (3) 
In this exercise, Lakoff illustrates how a language frame works. We cannot not 
think of an elephant-once the word enters our consciousness. According to Glenn W. 
Smith, writing in The Politics of Deceit, a frame consists of a whole array of images, 
words, or concepts that appear in our conscious or subconscious minds when we hear a 
term. He suggests that frames are "like logical word associations, contexts that determine 
the meaning of a term. Frames are reference points in the communal imagination. Without 
them, terms would float free of context and meaning" (194-195). 
Glenn Smith gives the example of the political term "tax relief," and explains how 
the choice of the word "relief' is intended to impart a very precise, connotative meaning 
because it implies the presence of 
a victim (or someone who is afflicted), an evil villain who caused the 
affliction, and a good hero or rescuer who will save the afflicted victim. So 
when the term 'tax relief is used, we immediately place it in a context that 
assigns to the taxpayer the role of victim, to tax proponents the role of evil 
villain and to the proponents of tax relief the role of hero. (195) 
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Framing the idea of a-cut, or reduction in taxes in this way tends to eliminate any 
consideration of the many critical benefits to citizens from the taxes they pay. It shows the 
power of framing to control the terms of debate. 
Further, Smith points out how the principle of framing is the basis for many 
negative political attacks because they can "force the target of the attack to invoke the 
negative frame while denying it" (195). As an example, the author relates how in the 2004 
election President Bush was put on the defensive, not by any real evidence that he did not 
complete his National Guard duty, but by mere questions and suppositions to that effect. 
He could not answer the questions without raising the negative implication, even though it 
was an unproven allegation. This tactic is a relative to definition for it acts to negatively 
define the opponent's ethos, which can have the collateral effect of enhancing the 
proponent's ethos in comparison. 
Smith goes on to argue that two types of frames have become paramount in 
American political discourse: one, communal myths and legends coupled with the rituals 
by which we celebrate them and which bind us together as a people, and two, the 
organization of the family, which is superimposed metaphorically on the discourse of 
politics (196). The ethical appeal makes heavy use of both. 
Frame #I-Myths and Ideographs: Cornerstones of Ethos 
In his article "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," 
contemporary theorist Michael C. McGee discusses how shared ideographs help people 
make sense of the world and bond them together into a community with, at a minimum, a 
loose, common ideology, which he refers to as "public motives" (14). McGee lists key 
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American ideographs as freedom, liberty, the rule of law, trial by jury, right of privacy, 
freedom of speech and religion, and the like. They are similar to Weaver's and Burke's 
"ultimate" terms. He says this vocabulary forms "the basic structural elements, the 
building blocks, of ideology" while adding that myths are often wrapped around these 
ideographs (7). McGee gives the following definition of an ideograph: 
An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is 
a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular 
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, 
excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as 
eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily 
recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (15) 
McGee adds that "each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the 
vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for 'belonging' to the society." Finally, he 
argues that politicians often use the vocabulary of ideographs to provide a persuasive link 
between rhetoric and ideology or to conceal the latter by the former in political discourse 
(7). 
Craig Smith says these specialized symbols or ideographs "ground public 
storytelling" and are well-known to the vast majority of the public. He emphasizes that 
ideographs are "pieces of sacred text taken from our civic religion." To McGee's list he 
adds ideals and values like the right to vote, equal protection under the law, free enterprise, 
and the American dream. Based on Smith's premises, speakers attempt to align the ethical 
appeal of their communications to these ideographs in order to persuade a wider group of 
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people to embrace their causes,Conversely, offending the values represented in the 
ideographs tends to cause a loss of support (23). 
Turning to the related concept of myths, Craig Smith relates how rhetoric emerged 
in myth and narrative storytelling in ancient cultures. He quotes Walter Fisher who 
explains that myths are powerful because they embody '"symbolic actions [which] have a 
sequence and meaning for those who live, create or interpret them"' (qtd. in Craig Smith 
23). In other words, Smith says, "stories are adapted to people's values and then 
reconstitute that people into a public-a coherent audience with fairly consistent beliefs, a 
coherent audience that can deal with the absurdities of the world." Smith argues that the 
public always needs the social crutch of some mythology to live by-the only question is 
whose mythology will prevail (23). 
Looking deeper at the operation of myths, Smith emphatically asserts that "rhetoric 
can remake reality and recreate a sense of publicness because it maintains the power of 
myths. He adds that "presenting a narrative of events is important to the message one 
wishes to convey." He relates the example of how, after months of testimony in 1996 in 
the Whitewater case, the investigating committee issued two reports, one by Republicans 
and one by Democrats, each with its own story or narrative account of what happened, the 
Republican one denigrated First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton while the Democratic one 
exonerated her. Smith submits it this way: 
Republicans believed the evidence demonstrated that First Lady Hillary 
Clinton had instructed her aides to cover up her involvement in Whitewater, 
while Democrats wove a story that placed the First Lady above suspicion. . . 
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In the Republice story, the First Lady was identified with powerful and 
manipulative archetypal women such as Lady MacBeth or the Queen in the 
fairy tale Snow White. In the Democratic story, the First Lady was identified 
with abused and misunderstood archetypal women such as Joan of Arc and 
Eleanor Roosevelt. (23-24) 
Smith observes that "the public was free to interpret each story as it saw fit." 
Whether either contains a measure of truth and fiction and are, therefore, part myth and 
part reality, this account is a good example of how mythmaking occurs in American 
politics and how myth is often tapped for the purposes of identification and ethical appeal. 
Frequently, public spectacle is involved in the creation of public myths as well. 
Arguably, in the instances of the highly orchestrated state funerals of Presidents Kennedy 
and Reagan, families and proponents wanted to turn these two men into larger-than-life 
legends, some for personal motives, others for partisan political motives. 
Frame #2-George Lakoff: Family-Based Metaphors Adapted for Political Language 
George Lakoff applies cognitive linguistics to political behavior in order to add 
another dimension of understanding about how politicians build identification and 
connection with voters. In Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, he 
explains that he "studies how people conceptualize the world. . . . [and his theory is] 
concerned with issues of worldview, that is, with everyday conceptualization, reasoning, 
and language. . . . how we conceptualize our everyday lives and how we think and talk 
about them" (3). He defines a conceptual metaphor as "a conventional way of 
conceptualizing one domain of experience in terms of another, often subconsciously" (4). 
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For example, an argument about,balancing the federal budget may be couched in terms of a 
metaphor: "just as a family's budget must be balanced, so must a nation's," which is a 
commonplace way to conceptually think and reason about this topic (3-4). 
This example segues into a key Lakoff premise: that the "Nation as Family 
metaphor is what links conservative and liberal worldviews to family-based moralities" 
(154). Lakoff breaks it down as follows: 
The nation is a family. 
The government is a parent. 
The citizens are the children. 
In another book, Don 't Think of an Elephant!, Lakoff points out that that we have 
"Founding Fathers," "Daughters of the Revolution," and we "send 'our sons' to war" (5). 
Picking back up in Moral Politics, he explains that the "Nation as Family" metaphor 
provides a means for people to reason about governance of the nation on the basis of what 
they can easily perceive about approaches to governance as exhibited in two different 
family models of parenting children, each of which is based on different moral systems. 
Lakoff associates conservative political ideology with the Strict Father model of 
parenting, and its related morality system, which features: the traditional nuclear family 
that revolves around the father as head, provider, protector, and authority, and the mother 
as upholding the father's authority. Self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate 
authority are the crucial behaviors a child must learn. Competition and the pursuit of self- 
interest are encouraged; by applying self-discipline to become self-reliant in the pursuit of 
self-interest in competition against others is how young people become mature, moral 
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adults. Survival is a matter of winning in competition. Mature children have to sink or 
swim by themselves; they are on their own; parents don't meddle. The Strict Father model 
could be summarized as a family in which an authoritarian father exercises dominance (an 
aspect of competitiveness) and expects his children to learn to do what is right and to 
compete and win, and to live on their own by embodying these approaches when they 
reach adulthood. 
In contrast, Lakoff likens liberals to the Nurturant Parent model and its related 
morality system, which features a family of preferably two parents, but perhaps only one; 
if two, the parents share household responsibilities. Open, two-way, mutually respectful 
communication is crucial. Parents explain to children why their decisions serve the cause 
of protection and nurturance. Proper questioning of parents by children is positive, since 
children need to learn why their parents do what they do, and since all family members 
should participate in important decisions. Responsible parents, of course, make the 
ultimate decisions and that must be clear. Children become responsible, self-disciplined, 
and self-reliant through being cared for and respected, and through caring for others. The 
principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives and to 
become nurturant themselves. A fulfilling life is assumed to be, in significant part, a 
nurturant life, one committed to family and community responsibility. When children are 
respected, nurtured, and communicated with from birth, they gradually enter into a lifetime 
relationship of mutual respect, communication, and caring with their parents. The 
Nurturant Parent model could be summarized as a family in which the parents are 
authoritative but approach each other and their children on the basis of cooperation, 
46 
empathy, understanding, and - mutual - .. concern, and they expect their children to learn and 
exhibit the same approach to life with each other, their parents, and others while they are 
growing up and when they reach adulthood. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to stop and think about the frames activated by the 
two terms: strict father and nurturant parent. Given the historical acculturation of parental 
role models, the term for liberals, "nurturant parent," may seem weaker to many and more 
difficult to identify with or imagine than "strict father," which perhaps creates a 
disadvantage for liberals before they get out of the starting gate.2 
In this system, Lakoff lays out the theoretical development that ties in the areas of 
moral action and corresponding model citizens for both the conservative and liberal 
worldviews. He translates these family values into morality systems that politicians tap 
into not only to define their worldviews but, more importantly, to select the language with 
which to communicate them to the populace. Matching the right language to the particular 
microsegment of the population targeted is important as well. In Don't Think of an 
Elephant!, Lakoff relates how it is not just conservatives who subscribe to the strict father 
family model of parenting; in fact, many people move back and forth between strict father 
and nurturant parent in different areas of their lives. For example, he explains how 
None of this is to argue, however, that either the strict father or the nurturant parent model is always best for 
parenting every child in every family situation, even as many citizens recognize that neither of the polar 
positions of the Republican and Democratic parties are always best for America. Indeed, a third alternative or 
middle way or centrist position may offer the more optimum solution in both family and civil government. 
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Reagan knew that blue-collar workers who were nurturant in their union 
politics were often strict fathers at home. He used political metaphors that 
were based on the home and family, and got them to extend their strict 
father way of thinking from the home to politics. . . . The goal is to activate 
your model in the people in the middle. . . . [who] have both models, used 
regularly in different parts of their lives. (21) 
Many would argue that common sense dictates that people will make decisions and 
voting choices based on some rational analysis of their self interest. However, Lakoff 
insists that 
people do not necessarily vote their self-interest. They vote their identity. 
They vote their values. They vote for who they identify with. . . . . It is not 
that people never care about their self-interest. But they vote their identity. . 
. . It is a serious mistake to assume that people are simply always voting 
their self-interest. (19) 
Lakoff's precept of identity parallels Burke's identification and both are linked 
primarily to the persuasive appeal of ethos and to a lesser extent to pathos, whereas 
determination of self-interest requires more of the analytical, cerebral logos. For the past 
twenty-five years or longer, conservatives have worked diligently to master this aspect of 
political strategy; hence their emphasis on the ethical appeal, especially the framing of 
positions in the language of family and moral values. 
Issue analysis is not the focus of this paper; my purpose is only to recognize what 
Lakoff's system portends for the operation of ethos in persuasion. Lakoff argues that 
48 
conservatives have been successful - - .. in framing the national metaphor as the strict father 
model, which supports the operation of conservative ideology. He holds that liberals, on 
the other hand, have failed to effectively frame the moral basis of their ideology. This is a 
key reason, he asserts, why conservatives as a whole have been more persuasive recently 
than liberals and hold majority power in government. 
Based on the theories of ethos already expounded, the practice of framing most 
political issues in terms of an underlying moral system ties closely to the ethical appeal. To 
align to such a moral system, a conservative leader must portray an ethos of character, 
authority, and discipline, that is, a strict, moral person ("strict father"), and must use the 
language of moral values, especially family values, to frame all debate. When he does, he 
produces identification at multiple levels, including connection at the subconscious 
conceptual level based on these deeply embedded beliefs. Thus the appearance of moral 
character and the skillful use of language frames go hand in hand to persuade the audience 
to embrace the political speaker and to accept his propositions for governing the country- 
sometimes without questioning--even when, at times, contrary to their own best interests. 
Bruce E. Gronbeck-The Electronic Presidency Raises the Bar on Ethos 
In the essay "The Presidency in the Age of Secondary Orality," in Beyond The 
Rhetorical Presidency, Bruce E. Gronbeck argues that a major shift in the treatment of 
presidential character has occurred hand-in-hand with the development of what he calls 
"the electronic presidency." Central to this premise is his concept of the "age of secondary 
orality." Gronbeck acknowledges Walter Ong as the one who originally characterized this 
current era as the age of secondary orality, and then Gronbeck observes that: 
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the notion of secondary . - .. orality suggests that our electronic public sphere 
has restored some of the characteristics of ancient oral culture. We are not 
talking about actual oral transactions, of course, but virtual intimacy, a 
verbal-visual-acoustic construction of a sense of conversation . . . a para- 
social interaction. Ong's metaphor of secondary orality usefully captures 
what has happened to the American presidency; although not actually oral 
in the sense of face-to-face communication, our political conversations have 
the feel of face-to-faceness, and our televised political spectacles are 
constructed to give the electorate a virtual presence-a ticket to what looks 
like a front-row seat to the political history of our times. (35) 
In other words, the medium of television brings the president, whatever presidential 
duties he may be doing, virtually into the family rooms of Americans, where he can 
convey messages directly to citizens and they can observe his persona, hear his words, and 
see carefully prepared images ("photo shoots") of his behavior. Of course, this facility does 
not apply to radio speeches and other communications media that are not televised. 
Gronbeck holds that the multi-mediated world has remade or at least drastically 
altered the dynamics of American politics, from the first "radio broadcast of gavel-to-gavel 
coverage of the party conventions" in 1924, to the 1952 party conventions at which Walter 
Cronkite popularized the concept of the television commentator, from the 1960 Kennedy- 
Nixon debates and the 1963 coverage of Kennedy's assassination and funeral and the civil 
rights march on Washington, to the highly glamorized convention films of Reagan, Clinton 
and the Bushes. He adds that the media seems to be destroying the symbolic distance 
50 
between the president and the - people, .. which tends to humanize the president (whoever is 
in office) and thereby to weaken his political power. He likens this situation to how 
Dorothy "discover[ed] the mundaneness of the Wizard [which] destroyed his ability to 
govern Oz" (3 1-34, 39-40). 
The response from the handlers of several presidents has been to tightly orchestrate 
the president's image-making opportunities and to make full use of the potential of 
constructed images mixed with other symbols to infuse the full range of sense perception, 
similar to what was discussed earlier under the heading of symbols. Gronbeck suggests that 
political rhetoric in our time is multimediated in that all three codes [ocular, 
verbal and phonic] contain signs that taken together or agglutinated become 
the meanings upon which we act. Unstated propositions-but propositions 
nonetheless-riddle our political environment. Meaning making is a 
multichannel activity. . . . [Therefore,] depiction rather than wordsmithing is 
now the main task of the president's key aides. . . . The ability of leaders to 
control all three channels in today's mediated world is absolutely essential 
to political survival. (42-43) 
So what does this have to do with ethos? Gronbeck suggests that Americans have 
too much information about everything, including problems at all levels of government. 
They cannot make sense of it all. He concludes that "gridlock" characterizes our times and 
attributes it not only to the "pigheadedness of political parties playing zero-sum games but 
also the multiplication of centers of information and expertise that feed their analyses and 
solutions into the public sphere via the mass media." He goes on to say that "people may 
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not know what's what, but at least they know what's right [emphasis mine]." Sensing this, 
politicians have taken steps to condense problems and their solutions to simplistic moral 
and patriotic themes such as articulation of family-value issues, a conclusion aligned to 
Lakoff's family-morality frames. On this basis, Gronbeck claims that much of American 
politics has been calibrated down to the moral and the patriotic-which is the realm of 
ethos. He asserts that: 
The word ethos itself stand[s] for both community as well as individual 
character [and it] perfectly captures the primary criterion for presidential 
success in the age of secondary orality. If the electorate cannot comprehend 
the multiple facets of issues, it has little choice but to select leaders on the 
basis of character. Logos has been disempowered by the complexities of the 
information age. Pathos has always been distrusted as a basis for political 
decision. Ethos is the one element of the classic trilogy left. Character can 
mediate . . . cutting through the mountains of information to find the krisis, 
or point of decision, that allows action to occur. (44) 
Continuing, the author holds, as does Aristotle, that in presidential rhetoric ethos is 
more than reputation-it is a performance that dynamically portrays the key characteristics 
of ethos. He refers to this facet as the "performative dimension" of presidential rhetoric, 
which is a key part of an expanded context of rhetorical discourse in politics (44-45). 
Thus Gronbeck hypothesizes the "centrality" of ethos in presidential rhetoric and 
provides convincing evidence for this important claim. However, his dismissal of pathos as 
a presidential tool of persuasion conflicts with the hypothesis, which will be discussed in 
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Chapter 3, that Bush's rhetorical, strategy includes a significant measure of the pathetical 
appeal (it should be noted that Gronbeck's essay was written before Bush became 
president). Moreover, his assumption-based premise that the average citizen is incapable of 
grasping the significance of both sides of the major issues of the day, meaning they cannot 
be trusted to participate in democratic choice-making beyond some broad identification 
with an abstract moral-connotative bloc basically argues for a totalitarian or at best a 
totalizing oligarchy or duopoly party system of government with a cosmetic face of ethos 
pinned on it-not a democratic one. 
C. A LIMITED SURVEY OF CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF PATHOS 
Although I focus predominantly on how rhetors wield the appeal of ethos, the 
pathetic appeal or pathos is often intertwined with ethos as well in the process of 
persuasion. This section provides a brief discussion of relevant concepts of pathos. 
When Aristotle catalogues the persuasive appeals of ethos, pathos, and logos in the 
Rhetoric, he emphasizes that the effective speaker should use these three modes together to 
persuade the audience: 
. . . the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech 
demonstrative and worthy of belief [logos]; he must also make his own 
character look right [ethos] and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the 
right frame of mind [pathos]. (1 377b) 
Aristotle explains that pathos, the pathetical appeal, is the appeal to the emotions, 
of putting the audience in the right emotional state of mind: 
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The man who - is to be in command of [the means of persuasion] . . . must 
be able . . . to understand the emotions . . . to know their causes and the way 
in which they are excited. (1356") 
... The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their 
judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, 
pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. (1378") 
Aristotle lists and discusses a series of emotions, one of which is "fear": 
To turn next to Fear, what follows will show the things and persons of 
which, and the states of mind in which, we feel afraid. Fear may be defined 
as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or 
painful evil in the future, . . . And even these only if they appear not remote 
but so near as to be imminent. . . . From this definition it will follow that 
fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us, or of 
harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain. Hence the very 
indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing 
itself is close at hand; the approach of what is terrible is just what we mean 
by "danger." (1 382") 
Aristotle points out that in order for some anticipated event or matter to truly make 
one afraid or fearful of danger, it must be perceived as 1) terribly destructive or harmful, 
and 2) near at hand or imminent. It is equally important to point out his hypothesis that 
"the very indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing itself 
is close at hand." This psychological tendency provides an opportunity for a manipulative 
54 
rhetor to fire the audience's emotions - into a state of fear by skillfully heaping on gruesome 
depictions of impending danger and doom and gloom that are false, exaggerated, not 
imminent, or partially or wholly framed out of context. 
Echoing Aristotle's tenet, contemporary theorists Williams and Cooper argue that 
persuaders who wish to move their audience to feel fear must not only 
create images of pain or destruction for their audience, but they must also 
make these dangers seem likely to happen. They must make their audience 
members feel that they are likely to be victims of these events . . . that these 
unpleasant images represent a very real and likely danger. . . (68). 
These authors incorporate modern research in psychology into the discursive 
development of pathos. They describe how "equilibrium theory" proposes that when 
people experience a cognition that is unpleasant or uncomfortable, they will naturally take 
action to eliminate the source of tension, thereby reestablishing equilibrium. They assert 
that: 
The general strategic principle . . . [for] persuaders . . . is as follows: 
Persuaders can influence their audiences by first creating cognitive 
imbalance. . . . Then the persuaders can link their own proposals with the 
reduction of that inconsistency. (69) 
Building on this basic concept of equilibrium theory, Williams and Cooper 
expound a theorem called "cognitive dissonance," which has the ability to answer more 
specific questions about how audience members respond to emotional appeals. Regarding 
this behavioral model, they propose that 
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it is not enough - to create the tension of cognitive dissonance in an audience. 
. . . In addition, cognitive dissonance theory advises the persuader to 
anticipate other possible means by which an audience could reduce 
dissonance-other than changing their attitude or behavior in accordance 
with the persuader's purposes-and to take steps to neutralize or eliminate 
these alternative means of tension reduction. For example, if a particular 
audience is apt to attempt to reduce dissonance by discrediting or 
derogating the source [persuader], the persuader must devote extra attention 
to shoring up her perceived credibility [ethos]. If a particular audience 
might be likely to reduce dissonance by deliberately not perceiving the 
discrepant message . . . then the persuader must take care to be clear and 
unambiguous in the presentation of the case. If a persuader anticipates that 
an audience might attempt to avoid the tension of cognitive dissonance by 
treating the course of tension as relatively unimportant, the persuader must 
take care to stress the importance of the issue, showing why it cannot be 
dismissed or ignored. (73) 
In these passages, Williams and Cooper theorize how peoples' psychological 
motivations and behaviors can be affected, even controlled, through a rhetorical process 
that, first, employs emotional appeals to create a cognitive state of disequilibrium, and then 
applies one or more of the persuasive appeals to frame the persuader's tension-removal 
mechanism as the one and only solution. 
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Summary: Theories of Analvsis 
This exposition of fundamental theories of ethos and, to a lesser extent, pathos, 
from classical and contemporary rhetoricians speaks to three critical elements. First, it 
defines what ethos is and identifies the main elements and techniques by which it is 
manifest, how it developed discursively from ancient times, and how it is used in the 
process of persuasion within a rhetorical situation in the postmodern world. A formal 
definition of ethos would list the following characteristics. In the process of persuasion, 
ethos represents the totality of a speaker's multiplex of characteristics, whether genuine or 
artificial, intentional or unintentional. It encompasses her known reputation from the past, 
although she strives to make her present, audience-adapted persona of character, 
competence, credibility, and goodwill-the performative dimension-pervasive and 
exclusive. It includes her audience-adapted message, with a plethora of persuasive 
techniques to portray her desired persona and to produce identification with the audience, 
at both the conscious and subconscious levels. All of these characteristics are conveyed 
through language and images or through other symbolic actions in order to exert an 
"ethical" appeal that frames and influences the subsequent choices of the audience in her 
favor. 
However, although the speaker crafts a persona and presents an ethos that may be 
composed of real and fabricated elements, it is the judges, the audience, who ultimately 
must assess what that ethos is, what it means to them, and whether it is credible. Further, 
the audience determines, based on both their perception of the whole rhetorical situation 
and their attitudes, beliefs and values, whether to embrace the speaker's message and act 
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on his requests, either because they consider them reasonably true to reality, or beneficial, 
or simply for reasons of identity and affinity. Ultimately, the nature of the interactive 
rhetorical situation is inherently dynamic, organic, ever-changing. 
The second vital aspect speaks to how the rhetor's motives influence her as she 
confronts the array of speaker choice presented by the rhetorical situation. This essential 
facet deals with the moral and ethical questions raised about how a speaker uses rhetoric 
strategically in her choices of ends and means in persuasion. Are choices of ends based on 
a narrow, self-serving, corporate-serving, institution-serving, political-party-serving 
ideology? Is a fictional persona portrayed, serving to veneer the real ethos, motives, and 
agenda of the rhetor? Are choices of means pragmatic and situational for mere appearance 
sake, that is, Aristotelian, with little genuine regard for universal principles? Or do they 
reflect the ideals, espoused by Quintilian and implied by Burke, Williams, Cooper, and 
others, of the ethical orator who is, first, authentic and virtuous and, second, a skilled 
speaker, that is, the good person who speaks well? The former allows the worst of human 
nature to predominate and impose a rhetoric of manipulation; the latter bridles human 
nature so that rhetoric is subservient to moral ends and means. 
The period of the past fifty years has been called the age of the rhetoric of 
manipulation because of the predominance of speakers/leaders/sellers, who, using 
advanced knowledge of psychology and rhetoric along with techniques of public relations 
and constructed visual images, often try to dictate the ends and .the means of rhetoric 
within human interactions, meaning that they make the choices, they set the agenda, they 
impose their worldview, they entice the purchase of their products. In other words, they 
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drive a process that dominates - and exploits the rhetorical situation to the advantage of their 
personal, ideological, institutional, or commercial interests-while they attempt to deplete 
or take away the free will, critical analysis, and independent choice of the audience. When 
this approach is pursued, the result is a rhetorical situation purposely manipulated for 
speakerAeader/seller dominance and advantage! Such behavior arises largely from the 
age-old paradigm of win-lose in human interaction. In other words, in order for melus to 
win, for mylour selfish personal or political advantage, for mylour power, control, and 
accumulation of prestige and wealth-youlyours must lose-and manipulation of the 
means is justifiable in order to achieve these ends. When persuaders choose to follow this 
pattern, customarily they construct an ethos of character, credibility, and win-win goodwill 
as a f a ~ a d e  to enhance the persuasive effect. 
In contrast, the authentic, virtuous individual who speaks well would seek to create 
openness and mutuality through discourse. Her ethos would be genuine, authentic. Her 
performative dimension would stress actual results as well as the rationales for goals for 
the future. Her agenda would be clearly communicated, for doing so would advance the 
participation of all in the work of promoting the common welfare, whether family, 
workplace, community, or government. A key goal would be to inform and educate the 
audience so they can participate effectively in the process of persuasion and decision- 
making, and politically, in the larger process of democracy. Courage and capable 
leadership would be required to build consensus based on reality and hard analysis among 
difficult and uncertain courses of action instead of relying on myth and rhetorical 
manipulation. In such a rhetoric, the authentic speaker would encourage the audience to 
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engage in sound critical analysis - .. of each viable option for personal and public choice- 
making, while working to promote consensus as to what constitutes the common welfare. 
The rhetorical ethical appeal of the authentic, virtuous man or woman emanates from such 
moral motives and ethics. 
Thirdly, this study explains how pathos may be combined with ethos to heighten 
the persuasive appeal. Specifically, it elucidates how a leader can frame an appeal to a 
negative emotion, in this case fear, as a means to create cognitive dissonance in the 
audience's minds and thereby prepare them to actively or passively accept the leader's 
proposed solutions. 
CHAPTER 3 
Applied Analysis: The Rhetorical Ethos of President George W. Bush 
In this section, by applying the theoretical principles and techniques from Chapter 
2, I analyze the rhetorical ethos portrayed by President Bush and how he adjusted his 
rhetoric after 911 1 to use pathos to set up his ethos. For this investigation, I choose several 
of his campaign and presidential speeches that set forth his primary rhetorical personae and 
major policy pronouncements. Regarding the latter, Bob Woodward in Plan of Attack 
affirms how "policy was made in speeches" in the Bush administration through the process 
of "[circulating] drafts . . . ironing out details and reaching consensus" (216). Woodward 
offers this conclusion in the context of Bush's state of the union speeches-all of which I 
have included in the sample. The selected speeches fall in the category of "deliberative 
rhetoric" and the president generally intended them for consumption, directly or indirectly, 
by the mass American audience. In addition, I take a brief look into the communications 
strategies of the Bush administration. 
A. Bush Speeches 
To aid the reader's orientation to actual historical events and to how Bush's 
rhetoric has evolved over the past five years, I have ordered the analysis chronologically, 
starting with the oldest Bush speech. 
6 1 
Bush Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention, August 3, 2000 
Thefirst rhetorical element exhibited in this speech is the creation of the persona of 
Bush as "a compassionate conservative," a theme that he stresses repeatedly in the 2000 
election campaign. 
Single moms struggling to feed the kids and pay the rent. Immigrants 
starting a hard life in a new world. Children without fathers in 
neighborhoods where gangs seem like friendship, where drugs promise 
peace, and where sex, sadly, seems like the closest thing to belonging. 
Bush commences the construction of the persona of "compassionate conservative" 
by tapping the power of pathos. With words like "single moms," "immigrants," and 
"children without fathers," he creates images of the downtrodden, of those who are 
struggling, of those who need a hand of compassion. In addition to describing their general 
circumstance in life, he pours forth more emotional appeal by referencing "gangs," 
"drugs," and abuse of "sex," intensifying the negative image of these unfortunate people, 
painting a scene of near desperation. He works to place the audience in an emotional state 
of deep concern, caring, even troubled, to the point of cognitive disequilibrium. 
When these problems aren't confronted, it builds a wall within our nation. 
On one side are wealth and technology, education and ambition. On the 
other side of the wall are poverty and prison, addiction and despair. And, 
my fellow Americans, we must tear down that wall. 
Against the backdrop of the sad, desperate scene and with the audience in an edgy 
emotional state, Bush creates another image, a wall of inequality and injustice, which 
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figuratively blocks the unfortunate - from escaping their plight. With this device, Bush 
brings the emotional appeal to a peak-he has put the audience in a receptive frame of 
mind to believe that he is empathetic to people's needs. Now he implies that he is the man 
with the plan for tearing down this wall. This metaphor echoes President Reagan's famous 
statement: "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall," during the cold war against communism. 
Of course, Bush's admiration of Ronald Reagan is well-known. It is unclear whether this 
phrase in Bush's speech was intended to copy Reagan's metaphor for explanatory purposes 
or to build identification by association with Reagan, or both. Nevertheless, the point is 
that the pathos is intertwined with and sets up several elements of ethical appeal: decrying 
inequality and showing empathy are associated with goodwill toward the audience, as is 
the inclusive "we"; describing the problem (the wall) and asserting that it needs to be torn 
down shows leadership and use of authority to effect change; and the potential 
identification that accrues from audience connections to Reagan. 
Big government is not the answer. But the alternative to bureaucracy is not 
indifference. It is to put conservative values and conservative ideas into the 
thick of the fight for justice and opportunity. This is what I mean by 
compassionate conservatism. And on this ground we will govern our nation. 
There is a lot going on in these few sentences. With two empty words "big" and 
"bureaucracy," Bush dismisses all the vast capabilities of the federal government from a 
direct role in helping citizens that are in sore need. The words are empty or devoid of 
meaning because no explanation, no rationale, no evidence, are given for the conclusion. 
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Next, after having hooked - - .. the audience to believe he is compassionate, in the 
italicized words in the quote, he uses a terministic screen, specifically the technique of 
transforn~ational redefinition, h la Craig Smith, to create an entirely new meaning of the 
concept "compassion," which is simply to use the power of the presidency to spread 
conservative values and ideas. Bush is establishing new boundaries and new approaches 
for how the country will be governed-the conservative ideology of limited government- 
rhetorically supported by an ethos of compassion. 
We will support the heroic work of homeless shelters and hospices, food 
pantries and crisis pregnancy centers-people reclaiming their communities 
block-by-block and heart-by-heart. . . . Government cannot do this work. . . 
. Yet government can take the side of these groups, helping the helper, 
encouraging the inspired. My administration will give taxpayers new 
incentives to donate to charity. . . . 
Bush reveals more of the plan, which calls for individuals and communities to 
provide the help and services needed by the less fortunate. He induces the American 
audience with emotional appeals to accept his approach by referring to them as "heroic" 
people who reclaim "their communities block by block," which conjures up an image of 
heroic soldiers at war. And he adds the phrase, "inspired helpers," which conveys the idea 
of divine inspiration, engendering an identification appeal to religious constituents. 
Government's role in the work of compassion, he declares, is to provide tax incentives for 
private donations. 
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Bush continues to transform the meaning of compassion: 
Instead, we must usher in an era of responsibility. In a responsibility era, 
each of us has important tasks-work that only we can do. Each of us is 
responsible . . . to love and guide our children, and help a neighbor in need. 
Synagogues, churches and mosques are responsible . . . not only to worship 
but to serve. . . . And to lead this nation to a responsibility era, a president 
himself must be responsible. 
In the persona of the strict father of the nation, Bush exercises authority by telling 
the citizens of the nation that they as well as religious institutions need to be responsible. 
Both should do the tasks or work that only they can do, implying that the government 
cannot do that work; instead, they must get out there and compete and win the rewards for 
themselves and serve and help others. When the audience hears the carefully framed 
language from several of the quoted passages above, the conceptual metaphor of the strict 
father-and-obedient children and all of its related branches of thoughts are triggered in 
their conscious and subconscious minds. For those in the audience who value the strict 
father model of parenting, which Lakoff shows can extend well beyond conservatives, 
identification and persuasion are generated. 
Looking at the big picture again, what started out as compassion has been redefined 
to personal responsibility. And Bush has implicated responsibility, and thereby 
competence, as well as authority to the make-up of his ethos. 
It is interesting to note that in succeeding speeches early in his first term as 
president, such as his "President Promotes Compassionate Conservatism" speech in San 
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Jose, Calif., on April 30,2002, - Bush .. is quick to emphasize that his brand of compassionate 
conservatism does not mean "sink or swim" responsibility. If the electorate were to 
perceive it as such, it could draw criticism; therefore Bush attempts to create a favorable 
interpretation. 
Returning to Bush's convention acceptance speech, my second area of focus is the 
construction of a persona of a man as a strong leader with character, optimism, and 
resolve. 
I am proud to have Dick Cheney at my side. He is a man of integrity and 
sound judgment, who has proven that public service can be noble service. 
America will be proud to have a leader of such character to succeed A1 Gore 
as Vice President of the United States. . . . Our current president [Bill 
Clinton] embodied the potential of a generation. So many talents. So much 
charm. Such great skill. But, in the end, to what end? So much promise, to 
no great purpose. . . . They had their chance. They have not led. We will. . . 
. [America's founders'] highest hope, as Robert Frost described it, was "to 
occupy the land with character." And that, 13 generations later, is still our 
goal . . . to occupy the land with character. . . . And so, when I put my hand 
on the Bible, I will swear to not only uphold the laws of our land, I will 
swear to uphold the honor and dignity of the office to which I have been 
elected, so help me God. 
In this excerpt, Bush stresses the ethical appeal of good moral character, ascribing 
righteousness, integrity, honor, and dignity to himself and vice presidential candidate Dick 
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Cheney, while at the same time - . seizing .. the opportunity to deploy the techniques of 
definition and framing to make Clinton and Gore, the latter his opponent, sound like 
unethical, untrustworthy politicians who abused the public trust. In fact, he uses the word 
character seven times in the speech, and words of similar meaning many more times. In 
the last sentence quoted in this excerpt, he tries to nail the lid on Clinton's, and by 
extension, Gore's, political coffins by strongly implying that unlike Clinton-Gore (here he 
uses the negative rhetoric of "division"), he would bring honor and dignity back to the 
White House (here he uses the positive rhetoric of "identification"). 
Bush stresses another aspect of his strong leader persona: 
Our opportunities are too great, our lives too short, to waste this 
moment. So tonight we vow to our nation. We will seize this moment of 
American promise. We will use these good times for great goals. We will 
confront the hard issues-threats to our national security, threats to our 
health and retirement security-before the challenges of our time become 
crises for our children. 
. . . In Midland, Texas, where I grew up, the town motto was "the sky is 
the limit" and we believed it. . . . Optimistic. Impatient with pretense. 
. . . I believe the presidency -- the final point of decision in the 
American government-was made for great purposes. It is the office of 
Lincoln's conscience and Teddy Roosevelt's energy and Harry Truman's 
integrity and Ronald Reagan's optimism. 
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In these comments, Bush, portrays the impression of a can-do strong leader who 
wants to lead America to make quantum leaps forward. Incorporating Seligman's tenet that 
the appearance of optimism is decisive in winning elections, Bush tries to appear as though 
he is bubbling over with exuberance. He repeats the word "optimism" twice and uses its 
kin, "energy," as well as other words and phrases like "opportunities," "great goals," "seize 
the moment," "the sky is the limit," "impatient," "great purposes," and "point of decision," 
which help paint the picture of positiveness, vigor, and decisiveness. He includes the 
referential value of Teddy Roosevelt, the exuberant, big-thinking 26th president, whom 
Bob Woodward in Plan of Attack describes as one of Bush's role models for his own 
presidential style (52). Further, Bush emphasizes his resolve with the phrase "we vow . . ." 
and repeating several times "we will. . . ." Woodward adds that "little [is] more appealing 
to President Bush than showing resolve" (81). And by alluding to "Lincoln's conscience" 
and "Harry Truman's integrity," Bush concurrently maintains the emphasis on character. 
Thus this speech constitutes one of Bush's many attempts to build, using audience- 
adapted language, a persona of the strong leader who possesses good character, an 
optimistic view of the country's possibilities, and the resolve to demand results. 
President Bush's Address to the Joint Session of Congress, February 27,2001 
This address is the first major deliberative speech, that is, one that addresses the 
legislative agenda, given by Bush as president, because his January inaugural would be 
classified as a ceremonial speech. This Joint Session address is a foundational speech of 
the Bush presidency in that he lays out themes and proposals of legislation for the entire 
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first term; therefore I devote the - broadest analysis to it. Since the Congress invited Bush to 
address them in the chamber of the U. S. House of Representatives regarding his first-year 
budget, it is virtually the same as a State of the Union speech (which is not given in the 
first year of the term of a newly elected president). The immediate audience is the senators 
and representatives present, but the real audience is the American people watching by 
television. 
He begins as follows: 
I want to thank so many of you who have accepted my invitation to come to 
the White House to discuss important issues. We're off to a good start. I will 
continue to meet with you and ask for your input. You have been kind and 
candid, and I thank you for making a new President feel welcome. . . . I 
hope America is noticing the difference, because we're making 
progress. Together, we are changing the tone in the Nation's Capital. And 
this spirit of respect and cooperation is vital, because, in the end, we will be 
judged not only by what we say or how we say it, we will be judged by 
what we're able to accomplish. 
In these opening remarks, Bush follows the classical pattern when he employs the 
ethical appeal of goodwill to conciliate the immediate audience as well as the entirety of 
the American public watching on television. Words and expressions like "thank you for 
making a new President feel welcome," "we're off to a good start," "you have been kind," 
"together, we are changing the tone," and "spirit of respect and cooperation," all work to 
reduce any animosity or illwill and to imply cooperativeness and likability. In the last 
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sentence, however, he moves ~ quickly .. to incorporate competence when he asserts that "we 
will be judged by what we're able to accomplish." In addition, this sentence exhibits 
authority, as Bush puts more edge into the discourse when he signals that he will use his 
office to push a legislative agenda. 
Following his introduction, Bush turns to budget issues: 
Year after year in Washington, budget debates seem to come down to an 
old, tired argument: on one side, those who want more government, 
regardless of the cost; on the other, those who want less government, 
regardless of the need. We should leave those arguments to the last century, 
and chart a different course. 
Government has a role, and an important role. Yet, too much 
government crowds out initiative and hard work, private charity and the 
private economy. Our new governing vision says government should be 
active, but limited; engaged, but not overbearing. And my budget is based 
on that philosophy. 
In the first paragraph of this passage, Bush adroitly sizes up the history of budget 
debates in Washington and demonstrates the ethical appeal of good sense and competence, 
both in his easy-to-understand assessment and in his call for moving beyond such 
stalemates. At the same time, in the combination of the two paragraphs, he skillfully sets 
up what what Craig Smith describes as transcendental redefinition and what Burke refers 
to as the concept of pontificating thirds, that is, Bush makes an authoritative statement, 
without any substantive rationale, that presumes to fairly deny the two polar positions in 
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order to overcome division, and constricts the debate to a supposed third alternative that he 
decrees for the budget issue. But close analysis reveals that, in effect, Bush has denied only 
one of the polarities, the liberal position, and that the third alternative is merely the second 
polarity, the conservative ideological budget position, shrouded in some new, ambiguous 
language. It is a clever ploy to gain acceptance for the original conservative objective. 
Also, in the last paragraph of the above quote, Bush tenderizes the ideological meat 
with the loaded ideographs of "hard work," "private charity," and "the private economy," 
usage that would tend to build identification with most Americans. 
[My budget] is reasonable, and it is responsible. It meets our obligations, 
and funds our growing needs. We increase spending next year for Social 
Security and Medicare, and other entitlement programs, by $8 1 
billion. We've increased spending for discretionary programs by a very 
responsible 4 percent, above the rate of inflation. My plan pays down an 
unprecedented amount of our national debt. And then, when money is still 
left over, my plan returns it to the people who earned it in the first place. 
In this passage, Bush returns quickly to wield once again the tool of ethos, coupled 
with logos, as evidenced by the use of descriptive language like "reasonable," 
"responsible," "meets our obligations," and "funds our growing needs," and his emphasis 
on continuity of entitlement program spending and paying down the national debt. He 
portrays himself as a president with good sense, practical wisdom, and competence, a 
leader who can be trusted not to wrench the nation too far from the its present course. In 
the last sentence about returning money, he substitutes a positive euphemism in place of 
7 1 
"tax cuts." Of course, as a whole, - - .. these are just words, chosen by his speechwriters to 
create an image of the president, to proactively characterize his budget on his terms, and to 
help make the audience receptive to these budgetary propositions as well as others that 
follow. Taking the last several passages together, his speechwriters did an effective job of 
sandwiching the hard, meaty ideology (limited government, tax cuts) between tasty slices 
of soft, persuasive, feel-good ethos. 
On another crucial issue, education, Bush advocates change: 
I like teachers so much, I married one. . . . When it comes to our schools, 
dollars alone do not always make the difference. Funding is important, and 
so is reform. So we must tie funding to higher standards and accountability. 
Bush begins with an ethical appeal to teachers and parents of schoolchildren as well 
as the general public through the technique of identification by mentioning that the first lady 
is a teacher and also by the use of a little levity. Then, in his persona of the authoritarian, 
strict father of the nation, he frames his approach in the terministic screen of reform and 
standards and accountability and results from schools and teachers. He continues: 
I believe in local control of schools. We should not, and we will not, run 
public schools from Washington, D.C. Yet when the federal government 
spends tax dollars, we must insist on results. Children should be tested on 
basic reading and math skills every year between grades three and 
eight. Measuring is the only way to know whether all our children are 
learning. And I want to know, because I refuse to leave any child behind in 
America. 
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In this paragraph Bush - sets up a contradictory "yes-but" discourse structure in 
which he states that schools should be controlled locally, an American ideograph, but then 
proposes legislation that will give the federal government control over much of what local 
schools do in the classroom where it counts. The point I make is not about which policy is 
best. Instead, it is that Bush understands this conflict and is intentionally trying to blur the 
distinction. Rhetorically, Bush is having his cake and eating it, too, regarding who calls the 
shots in the nation's public primary and secondary school systems. 
He closes the paragraph with a catchy slogan, which will become the title of the 
legislation: "I refuse to leave any child behind in America." But it is much more than a 
slogan, as he draws upon the emotional power of the image of the "abandonded child," 
which slices through raw nerve endings deep into the hearts and consciousness of the 
audience. Within the rhetorical situation, Bush successfully alters the audience's emotional 
frame of mind, influencing their current and future receptivity to his substantive changes in 
eductional policy. This bonanza of an image will not be easily forgotten-it can be recalled 
to the minds of hundreds of millions at any time just by verbalizing the short slogan. Also, 
this same expression taps into American ideographs like equal opportunity and the 
American Dream, substantially at the subconscious level of people's minds. At the same 
time, Bush has portrayed an ethos of fairness, good character, and goodwill toward the 
nation's families and their opportunities. 
Having dealt with education of children, he moves to concerns of the elderly. 
To make sure the retirement savings of America's seniors are not diverted in 
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any other program, - - .. my budget protects all $2.6 trillion of the Social 
Security surplus for Social Security, and for Social Security alone. 
Again, in the persona of the protective father who possesses good sense and 
competence, as well as the pathetic appeal of caring, Bush states that he will protect the 
Social Security surplus for America's seniors and not divert it to other programs. 
Regarding the national debt and deficit spending, he submits: 
Many of you have talked about the need to pay down our national debt. I 
listened, and I agree. I hope you will join me to pay down $2 trillion in debt 
during the next 10 years. At the end of those 10 years, we will have paid 
down all the debt that is available to retire. That is more debt, repaid more 
quickly than has ever been repaid by any nation at any time in history. . . . 
We should approach our nation's budget as any prudent family would. . . . 
Unrestrained government spending is a dangerous road to deficits, so we 
must take a different path. 
With words like "I listened" and "prudent" contrasted with "unrestrained" and 
"dangerous," Bush promotes an ethos of himself as a man of good sense, competence, and 
goodwill as well as appealing on the basis of logical reasoning. Bush also exhibits 
goodwill when he respectfully entreats: "I hope you will join me to pay down. . . ." 
Further, the sentence, "we should approach our nation's budget as any prudent family 
would," shows that Lakoff's "nation as family" metaphor is operative, once again 
engendering identification through these conceptual systems extant in the minds of the 
audience. 
74 
With superior rhetorical - flourish, Bush turns to a key ideological tenet, tax cuts. 
I hope you will join me in standing firmly on the side of the people. You 
see, the growing surplus exists because taxes are too high and government 
is charging more than it needs. The people of America have been 
overcharged and, on their behalf, I am asking for a refund. 
He starts by implying a dichotomy between those "firmly on the side of the people" 
and those on the other side, those against the people, that is, the government, which 
charges too much in taxes, and presumably Democrats and others. Of course, he asserts 
that he stands "firmly on the side of the people." While Bush plies the technique of 
identification to positively unite those on one side of the dichotomy, he applies division to 
negatively alienate those on the other side-the latter can be redeemed only by switching 
to his side, the side that favors tax cuts. 
Bush erects several Burkean terministic screens. "Charging" implies a demand for 
payment, to hold one financially liable, or to incur a financial burden, which together 
create a composite negative image of the government as a big, bad creditor oppressing 
citizens like helpless debtors. "Overcharged builds on and intensifies this negative image. 
"Refund" relates to this image but also fortifies the ethos Bush is concurrently constructing 
of himself as the leader/hero/strict father of good moral character and goodwill who has 
come to their rescue and who will use his authority to discipline the bad government and 
right these wrongs. 
A rate of 15 percent is too high for those who earn low wages, so we must 
lower the rate to 10 percent. No one should pay more than a third of the 
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money they earn - .. in federal income taxes, so we lowered the top rate to 33 
percent. 
In the first sentence, Bush allows that "a rate of 15 percent is too high for those 
who earn low wages, so we must lower the rate to 10 percent." On its face, this statement 
engenders emotional and ethical appeal by way of showing concern for low-income 
people. But why is this sentence really here? Bush continues in the next sentence: "No one 
should pay more than a third of the money they earn in federal income taxes, so we 
lowered the top rate to 33 percent." The former gives the impression of concern about tax 
levels for those of low income on parity with concern in the latter for those with high 
income. But according to an analysis of Bush's final tax cut legislation by William G. Gale 
and Peter R. Orszag in Tax Notes, published by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution 
Tax Policy Center, the lowest 20 percent of income earners in America received less than 1 
percent of the total dollars of Bush's tax cuts while the top 20 percent income segment 
received 7 3  percent of the dollars of tax cuts. Where is the parity? The argument I make is 
not for or against the tax cut legislation. The purpose is to show how it appears that the 
first sentence is a rhetorically constructed set-up, which makes use of the Burkean tenet 
about the use of form to gain acceptance, in order to imply concern for low-income citizens 
primarily as a means to gain support for cutting taxes predominantly for higher income 
taxpayers. 
Aside from the form-based parity construct, the statement: "No one should pay 
more than a third of the money they earn in federal income taxes, so we lowered the top 
rate to 33 percent,'' is an interesting piece of rhetorical work. Bush uses the first part of the 
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sentence as a premise or a reason - for his plan to lower the top rate to 33 percent. But the 
first part of the sentence is, in effect, a conclusion, one that, according to Anthony Weston 
in A Rulebook for Arguments, makes use of the non sequitur argument fallacy, that is, "a 
conclusion that is not a reasonable inference from the evidence" (77). It is also an 
inadequate argument because it begs several questions, that is, it merely assumes the 
conclusion to be correct without providing any evidence, which leaves the audience asking 
questions about how or on what basis the speaker arrived at the conclusion. Why is one- 
third the magic number? Back in the 1950s, for example, ultra-high income individuals 
(the top 1 percent) were subject to a 90 percent tax rate. Another question it begs is: who 
says one-third is the right threshold for a revised tax rate cap, other than Bush alone? On 
top of the fallacies of non sequitur and begging several questions, this is another example 
of empty language-it is devoid of meaning because no explanation or rationale is given. 
Thus Bush attempts to authoritatively decree this new tax rate cap, without any basis of 
analysis, reasoning, or argument. 
Next, he turns to an example. 
With us tonight representing many American families are Steven and 
Josefina Ramos . . . from Pennsylvania. But they could be from any one of 
your districts. Steven is the network administrator for a school 
district. Josefina is a Spanish teacher at a charter school. And they have a 
two-year-old daughter. 
Steven and Josefina tell me they pay almost $8,000 a year in federal 
income taxes. My plan will save them more than $2,000. Let me tell you 
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what Steven says: - 'Two thousand dollars a year means a lot to my family. If 
we had this money, it would help us reach our goal of paying off our 
personal debt in two years' time.' After that, Steven and Josefina want to 
start saving for Lianna's college education. 
As Aristotle theorized, creating ethical appeal involves assessing the characteristics 
of an audience and constructing discourse in such a way as to portray oneself as 
embodying the same characteristics. In this text, Bush attempts to persuade the audience of 
the merits of his plan by identifying himself and his plan with this live, present couple, 
with whom many Americans can identity. Which Americans, or said another way, what 
audience is Bush talking to at this point? Is it wealthy taxpayers? No, they do not need any 
convincing. He is talking to the masses of the electorate that are middle income 
taxpayers-the ones who determine election outcomes. Do middle income Americans 
identify closely with Bush, an ultra high income, high net worth individual? Unlikely. 
Thus the Ramoses fill a surrogate role in this regard for Bush-this middle income 
audience can readily identify with this couple, who appear as a normal middle income 
family. This audience can identify with the Ramoses' concern that $8,000 is a lot to pay in 
taxes each year. This audience can identify with the Ramoses' goal of getting out from 
under personal debt. This audience can identify with the Ramoses desire to start saving for 
their young daughter's college education. Thus this approach yields Bush the rhetorical 
draw of identification that he could not otherwise engender with his own ethos; at the same 
time it diverts the audience's attention away from contemplating benefits accruing to the 
high income segment-Bush's class-which could lead to thoughts of alienation. 
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Deconstructing this rhetorical - construct further, the Ramoses are a Hispanic 
family-one of the groups Bush and conservatives are targeting for joining the Republican 
Party or at least voting Republican. This couple automatically creates identification for 
Bush with this ethnic group. 
In the above text, Bush puts another device into the service of persuasion-the 
example. He carefully relates how the Ramoses pay $8,000 in taxes and will save $2,000 
under his plan, which constitutes a logic-based proof. However, he uses one family-just 
one-out of over 100 million families in the U.S. to show how great and how fair ("my tax 
plan restores basic fairness") his tax cut proposal is. Anthony Weston in the third edition of 
A Rulebook for Arguments points out how easy it is for a persuader to mislead an audience 
in making the case for a proposal by manipulating examples. He explains that one example 
is, at best, merely an "illustration," but for "generalizations about larger sets, a 
representative sample is required." Since the number of taxpayers in America is definitely 
a "larger set," to avoid manipulating the facts, Bush would have needed to provide data on 
a statistically representative sample of taxpayers across the full range of income 
distributions in America. Weston also stresses the importance of testing generalizations by 
considering "counterexamples," that is, examples that are contrary to or refute a 
generalization (12, 17). Dozens of counterexamples were available for Bush to offer up. 
But Bush chose to offer a single example that painted an appealing picture of his plan. 
Obviously, his budgetary staff had run the numbers and knew precisely the effects of his 
tax plan on the full distribution range of taxpayers, but Bush chose a sole, particular one 
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that would appeal to the middle - income audience whose support he needed to win in order 
to persuade Congress to pass his tax-cut plan. 
In addition, according to the analysis by Gale and Orszag, a family had to be in 
about the top 20 percent of income of all taxpayers in order to receive a $2,000 tax cut like 
the Ramoses. In comparison, the average tax cut for the bottom 80 percent averaged just 
over $600. Thus the Ramoses are not representative of the middle of the middle-they are 
in the upper middle income bracket-but their personal characteristics such as working for 
schools make them appear as middle of the middle, which helps cement the identification. 
The Bush public relations team found the nearly perfect "rhetorical" taxpayer couple for 
embodying his ethical and logical appeals to his targeted audiences. 
Bush also says: 
We reduced the marriage penalty. . . . We must repeal the death tax. . . . Tax 
relief. . . . 
"Penalty," "death," and "relief' are all words that act as terministic screens; they 
frame the terms of debate. "Penalty" and "death" channel or frame the tax items in a bad or 
negative connotation of a cruel tax collector taking advantage of citizens, the victims, 
which sets up a state of mind of cognitive dissonance, while "relief' sets up a positive 
image of Bush as the one who will rescue the victims and bring relief, restoring peaceful 
equilibrium. This loaded language directs the audience's attention in one direction while 
deflecting it from asking for analysis. For example, who could favor preserving such 
onerous, wrong taxes? Who could be against the solution for relief? 
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Bush adds: ~ - .. 
Tax relief is right. . . . We must act now because it is the right thing to do. 
In case the earlier devices do not persuade, Bush now brings to bear Gronbeck's 
postulate that "people may not know what's what, but at least they know what's right" 
(35). Once again, he exploits empty language with this simplistic moral theme. Once again, 
he ignores several questions. Why is it right? What is the rationale? Who says it is right? 
Touching on another issue of the elderly, Bush asserts: 
"No senior in America should have to choose between buying food and 
buying prescriptions." 
Who could be against this proposition regarding adding a Medicare prescription 
benefit? This empty, emotionally-loaded statement is framed with carefully couched, hard- 
to-criticize language that tends to deflect debate and skip analysis. The statement 
overflows with pathos, through the image of the neglected, impoverished senior who exists 
at the edge of survival, forced to choose between two essentials of life. People tend to react 
aggressively to such a pathetic image4 lde r  care is important to Americans. Yet, where is 
the plan? How will it work? Who will receive what benefits? Who pays for them? What 
are the alternatives? 
The following are excerpts from Bush's conclusion: 
"The agenda I have set before you tonight is worthy of a great 
nation. America is a nation at peace, but not a nation at rest. Much has been 
given to us, and much is expected [New Testament verse]. Let us agree to 
bridge old divides. But let us also agree that our goodwill must be dedicated 
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to great goals. - Bipartisan is more than minding our manners. It is doing our 
duty. 
. . . We can . . . earn from our conscience and from our fellow citizens 
the highest possible praise: Well done, good and faithful servants [New 
Testament verse]. 
Thank you all. Good night and God bless. 
The ethical appeal weighs heavily in this closing with words and ideas like: 
"worthy," "a great nation," "duty," "conscience," and so forth. This language and the 
concepts embodied appeal to common heritage, nobleness, shared values and beliefs, 
ideographs, goodwill, group ethos, and moral character. This identification is extended, 
too, with the appeal of Bible verses to the religious right as well as most Christians. The 
sentence, "But let us also agree that our goodwill must be dedicated to great goals," 
maintains an edge of competence and authority, which portray Bush as a strong leader who 
will push Congress to produce results for the nation. And when he connects "bipartisan" to 
"duty," in effect he is attempting to strong-arm Democrats into supporting his plans. 
My analysis reveals the primacy of ethos throughout the speech, although this 
particular persuasive appeal is used more extensively in the opening and closing sections. 
Pathos is also wielded effectively, along with a lesser utilization of logos. All of the 
appeals are ultimately directed to the American people, the primary audience. This 2001 
speech is generally representative of Bush's rhetorical style in later State of the Union 
addresses as well as most other presidential speeches. Purely in terms of influencing the 
minds and choices of the audience, it is a masterfully crafted speech, one that not only 
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subtly reflects key Bush ideological tenets but also capitalizes on many of the rhetorical 
devices of persuasion, especially techniques of the appeal of ethos. 
Seven months later, the events of 911 1 fall from the sky on the U.S. and on the 
Bush presidency, leading nine days later to another critical Bush speech. 
President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress after 911 1, September 20,2001 
Below are excerpts taken from several paragraphs of the speech: 
I I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens 
have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of 
a continuing threat. . . . 2 ~ e  will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not 
fail. . . . -'I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted 
it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for 
freedom and security for the American people. 4 ~ h e  course of the conflict is 
not known, yet its outcome is certain. "reedom and fear, justice and 
cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral 
between them. [numbering mine] 
In the third sentence, Bush's extensive use of first person "I" reflects the 
dominance-language technique of "personalization," according to a premise of Renana 
Brooks in an article in The Nation titled " A  Nation of Victims: Bush Uses Well-Known 
Linguistic Techniques to Make Citizens Feel Dependent." By this choice of pronoun Bush 
focuses the attention of the audience on himself as speaker, on his character, and on his 
role as sole, authoritarian protector, like the strict father in the family, rather than on the 
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audience, the American people. - - He .. includes the ideograph "freedom," apparently because 
freedom represents a much larger, abstract American ideal or value, which he 
superimposes in order to secure a stronger bond of identification with the audience. Bush 
paints a character image of himself as relentless warriorlleader that the people can rely on 
to save their lives, their freedom, their culture. It has the same effect as Bush saying he is 
the only person capable of producing the results needed, in this case, protecting Americans 
from al-Qaeda, and they can just trust him and leave their fate in his hands-he will protect 
them and secure the nation. 
When Bush uses the second person pronoun, "we," as he does in the second 
sentence, he employs it in a way that again focuses attention on himself by making the 
individuals who constitute the "we" a virtual extension of himself, the strong leader who 
makes the decisions-the "we" is made up of those who join with him, which he attempts 
to persuade Americans to do. 
In the fourth sentence, Bush projects what would become one of his rhetorical 
hallmarks: "verbal certainty," according to Roderick P. Hart and Jay P. Childers in "Verbal 
Certainty in American Politics: An Overview and Extension" published in Presidential 
Studies Quarterly. Obviously there was a feeling of unease and uncertainty after 911 1, 
against which Bush postures his verbal certainty as an aspect of portraying himself as the 
strong leader. Although the probability of a successful outcome of planned military 
operations in Afghanistan would have appeared relatively high, it was by no means totally 
certain. The fact that Osama Bin Laden and Aiman A1 Zawahri, Nos. 1 and 2 in al-Qaeda, 
the primary targets of Operation Enduring Freedom, managed to slip through the grasp of 
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the U.S. military in 2002 and remain free three years later is an obvious case in point-and 
one that indicates an element of demagoguery in such rhetorical certitude. 
The first sentence could be viewed as an acknowledgement of "fears" in the face of 
a potentially "continuing threat" as well as a call to be "calm and resolute," which 
presumably is Bush's intent on this occasion. I draw attention to it here because in future 
speeches that I analyze, the specter of rhetorical exploitation of the circumstances and 
emotions of citizens relative to 911 1 becomes a topic of inquiry. 
In all of these sentences, Bush piles on word after word of emotion-laden language 
to appeal to the hearts and emotions of Americans: "hug your children," "wound," 
"inflicted," "not forget," "struggle," "freedom," "fear," "justice," "cruelty," and "God." Of 
special note is the dichotomy created between good (freedom, justice) and evil (fear, 
cruelty). "Freedom" and "justice" appeal both ethically and emotionally, whereas "fear" 
and "cruelty" are words that primarily stir the emotions-on a negative level. With so 
much emphasis on the negative emotions, Bush seems not to only acknowledge but to 
stoke feelings of fear and uncertainty. Perhaps this approach, along with the heavy 
personalization, is rhetorically overdone. 
Overall, Bush's rhetoric to project himself as a war president with an image of 
strength immediately after 911 1 seems appropriate to the time and circumstance, following 
the example of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt in World War 11. Most would 
agree that his rhetoric in this speech, within the context of the rhetorical situation of 911 1, 
generally serves a right and moral purpose of building a consensus for a pivotal course of 
military action in Afghanistan. 
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Although not comprehended ~ - .. at the time, as 911 1 was a turning point in the Bush 
presidency, so was this speech in Bush's presidential rhetoric. As will be shown in the next 
analysis, in the speech above Bush laid the foundation for what would become the new, 
signature rhetorical strategy of his presidency. 
President Bush's State of the Union Address, January 29,2002 
In this speech, Bush reiterates and builds on most of the same themes contained in 
the previous year's address described above. However, the major difference is that this 
speech takes place a few months after 911 1 and Bush, as commander-in-chief, is leading 
the country in what he calls the "war on terror." 
In this context, even Bush's application of the word "war" constitutes a terministic 
screen-a very important one in Bush's rhetoric since 911 1-because it allows Bush to 
define himself as a "war president." It provides rhetorical cover for Bush's push to expand 
foreign military actions beyond Afghanistan. It enables Bush to declare captured foreign 
persons (some combatants, some not) U.S. citizens (e.g., Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose 
Padilla) captured on foreign soil or within the U.S. as "enemy combatants" and hold them 
indefinitely without any judicial process and without the protections against torture 
accorded to prisoners of war under the Geneva conventions, to which the U.S. is a 
signatory. And to whatever extent the Bush administration has failed to vigorously 
implement a full complement of specific, concrete measures to strengthen security at 
home, it affords a means of deflection of that reality. 
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Before looking at the - text of the speech, it is worth noting how Bush's delivery 
changes after 911 1. In a visual element, he adopts a speaking persona that is more somber 
(gravitas) and dignified (dignitas), along with a more restrained presence (lenitas), which 
is patterned in part on the Ciceronian model. Perhaps Bush's natural personality as a 
speaker-somewhat reserved, stiff, tightly wound, mechanical-makes it easy to adopt this 
new approach to delivery. In addition, it seems that with practice over time, Bush's 
speechwriters became more proficient at crafting the diction, syntax, and rhythm in the 
speech texts to better accommodate Bush's natural vocalization style. Regardless, the 
modified delivery style works well as Bush now embodies the image of the grave "war 
president." I begin with some excerpts that help form a set-up of this persona. 
As we gather tonight, our nation is at war . . . and the civilized world faces 
unprecedented dangers. . . . We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. . 
. . Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears, and showed us 
the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' 
hatred in videos. . . . And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the 
madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of 
American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed 
instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American 
cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout 
the world. . . . Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of 
murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the 
world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning. 
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[North Korea, - Iran, and Iraq,] states like these, and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them 
the means to match their hatred. 
Renana Brooks, head of the Sommet Institute for the Study of Power and 
Persuasion in Washington, D.C., claims that Bush depicts the world in very dire, 
pessimistic, dark, and negative language and she argues that the Bush administration has 
come to rely most frequently on a negative linguistic frame of the world. She maintains 
that Bush and his team, using the emotionally-loaded language of the pathos of fear, 
picture to the electorate a negative, pessimistic image of a dark and evil world. She 
proposes that they employ catastrophic words and phrases, which are drilled into 
American's minds with overwhelming repetition, to the point of breaking down 
independent thought and analysis, which in turn produces a sense of fearfulness and a high 
level of anxiety that ultimately leads to a sense of helplessness, to a feeling of loss of 
control over their environment (20). 
Although Brooks does not connect it as such, in the context of Bush's strategic 
rhetoric, this framework acts on the audience as a giant terministic screen, limiting and 
defining their field of mental and emotional vision to the singular, negative world image 
graphically painted in dark, foreboding colors by Bush. Likewise, Bush's apocalyptic 
words and phrases, such as: "faces unprecedented dangers," "hour of shock and suffering," 
"confirmed our worst fears," "the depth of our enemies hatred," "the madness of the 
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destruction they design," "axis - of evil," terrorists "seeking weapons of mass destruction," 
and "grave and growing danger," act as individual screens that add to the composite 
framework of the negative, evil world. His use of the metaphor about thousands of 
dangerous killers spread around the world like ticking time bombs mounds up yet more of 
the pathos of fear and dread. 
Aristotle posits that the "very indications" of an anticipated event or matter can 
make people afraid and fearful of danger if they are led to perceive that it is terribly 
destructive or harmful and near at hand or imminent. Bush's rhetoric seems to embody 
these characteristics. 
Bush continues: 
The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to 
normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will. 
Apparently, verbal certainty can be used positively and negatively, for here Bush 
says life for Americans "never will" return to normal. Brooks maintains that Bush 
describes the nation as being in a "perpetual state of crisis" that leaves the electorate 
feeling powerless. She refers to the work of psychologist Martin E.P. Seligman, whose 
"studies of 'learned helplessness' shows that people's motivation to respond to outside 
threats and problems is undermined by a belief that they have no control over their 
environment" (2 1). 
For example, what can an individual citizen do to fight terrorists? Of course, we 
can be alert and young adults could volunteer for the armed forces. But there is little 
tangible action that the average citizen can take, other than vote someone else into office 
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who would address the problem ~ - .. differently. But even here, fear dampens the desire to take 
the risks that accompany electing a new president while the nation is at war-and Bush 
placed this very tactic of fear of change of leadership at the core of his 2004 campaign 
rhetoric. For example, my eighty-one-year-old mom, who admired Bill Clinton's policies 
and accomplishments (although not necessarily him personally) but generally disliked 
Bush, told me in 2004 her reservations about changing presidents during the war in Iraq. 
The White House political strategists correctly gauged that senior citizens would recall 
how the country elected another war president, Franklin Roosevelt, to four terms and that 
they would respond favorably to this theme of keeping the current war president, Bush, at 
the helm for four more years. In time of perceived danger and fear, helpless-feeling 
citizens accord a president considerable latitude, as long as they trust him. 
Following the construction of an emotionally fearful world, Bush says: 
But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no 
mistake about it: if they do not act, America will. 
. . . States like these [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq], and their terrorist 
allies, constitute an axis of evil. . . . seeking weapons of mass destruction. . 
. We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, 
while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. 
The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous 
regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. 
As with the September 20,2001 speech, Bush returns to the device of 
personalization, the use of "I," to focus the attention on himself as the strong war leader. 
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And when he personifies the - "United States" and "America," it is the same as inserting the 
word "I" for each: "[I]will not permit;" "if they do not act, [Ilwill," as president and 
commander-in-chief. Reflecting a dominance behavior style, Bush makes clear he is 
calling the shots (like the strict father) and that he expects the country (the children) to 
follow without questioning. Brooks argues that the motive behind Bush's use of the 
negative world frame is to create a relationship of dependency between the American 
people and himself, a dependency that allows him to operate in his natural behavioral style, 
which is dominance of others, and which promotes acceptance, even if grudgingly, of his 
agenda and policies. Brooks asserts that Bush has mastered "emotional language- 
especially negatively charged emotional language-as a political tool.. . [and that he] 
employs language of contempt and intimidation to shame others into submission and 
desperate admiration" (20). 
Once Bush has worked to place the electorate into a state of mind of fear and 
helplessness, Brooks submits that he then attempts to convince people that he is the only 
one with the strength to deal with the terrible, dangerous world confronting them. This 
means that he is entitled to expect them, in this relationship of dependency, to transfer their 
power to him, to rely on and support him as sole deliverer from an evil, dangerous world 
(22-23). 
This idea is backed up by Williams' and Cooper's theorem that a persuader can 
employ emotional appeals to create a state of cognitive dissonance (fear and dread of a 
hostile, evil world that poses imminent danger), which provides an opening for the 
persuader to sell his tension-removal mechanism as the one and only solution (Bush, the 
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strong war president, who can - decide, nearly unilaterally, who the enemy is and direct how 
to eradicate them and thereby save the populace). 
I summarize this new, signature rhetorical strategy, as follows: By exploiting the 
pathos of fear, Bush creates a negative frame, a pessimistic image, of a dark and evil 
world, through the language of catastrophic words and phrases, which are drilled into 
American's minds with overwhelming repetition, all of which in turn produces a sense of 
fearfulness, or a heightened consciousness of potential danger, and a high level of anxiety, 
and ultimately leads to a breakdown of independent thought, analysis, and will-to a sense 
of helplessness. Helpless-feeling people tend to look to a strong leader to solve their 
problems. In such circumstances, they may accord the leader significant latitude as long as 
they feel a sense of trust in him. After 911 1, Bush postures himself in precisely that persona 
or ethos: the strong, moral leader and war president who knows exactly what needs to be 
done to fix the world and the one who can be relied on to get the job done. 
In this strategy, I suggest that Bush successfully exerts a one-two rhetorical punch 
of pathos that puts the audience in the right frame of mind, followed by an artfully 
constructed ethos of the strong, moral leader and war president, all of which work together 
to narrow the choices of the American electorate and to persuade them to embrace or at 
least go along with his worldview and the propositions of his personal or party ideology for 
dealing with it. 
But notice the following taken from the very beginning of this same speech: 
The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who 
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once occupied - Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. . . . We 
are winning the war on terror. 
Bush started the speech by relating these very positive images of success in the war 
in Afghanistan. He obviously was pleased to share these excellent outcomes that reflected 
favorably on himself as president and commander-in-chief. What seems askew, though, is 
how this opening positivism of success squares with all the negativism, dread, worry, 
unprecedented danger, and general fright-mongering that follow it. Taken together, the 
message that Bush seems to communicate is that on the one hand, "I am leading the 
country to decisive victory," but on the other hand, "you ought to be shaking in your boots 
with fright from all the dangers around you." I argue that Bush's strategists decided to play 
both ends of Seligman's work (learned helplessness and learned optimism), but to different 
players. While they frame a persona of optimism for Bush to occupy, they frame a 
consciousness of pessimism and helplessness for the public to occupy. These meanings 
appear incongruent. 
Next, Bush turns to domestic issues in this speech. Notice the transition. 
September the 1 lth brought out the best in America, and the best in 
Congress. . . . Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed 
toward addressing problems here at home. . . . As we act to win the war, 
protect our people, and create jobs in America, we must act, first and 
foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans. . . 
We'll prevail in the war, and we will defeat this recession. 
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After establishing and ~ strengthening - .. his position as war president, now the wedge 
that Bush brings to bear as persuasive leverage to gain assent for many of his initiatives is 
the "war on terror." The sentence, "Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit 
directed toward addressing problems here at home," signals his intentions. Apparently, 
Bush and his strategists came to realize how the power of a common enemy could serve to 
unite the country behind the president as strong leader and protector. They comprehended 
how the "war on terror" could provide a means to political advantage on other issues. Thus 
Bush moves opportunistically to capitalize on this opening and begins to shroud many of 
his initiatives in the rhetorical context of the "war on terror" and the special war powers he 
assumes in his war presidency. For instance, an analysis of a sample of Bush's stump 
speeches on behalf of candidates in the 2002 midterm elections reveals that he devotes 
one-third or more of his message to describing the war on terror and what he is doing to 
fight it and then emphasizing that he can count on the local Republican candidate to aid the 
president's efforts in this cause. Republicans gained several seats in Congress in this 
election. 
Within the context of this dynamic rhetorical move by the White House, Bin Laden 
and al-Qaeda, dangerous terrorists though they are, and the "war on terror" have 
individually and severally become rhetorical scapegoats, the source of much that ails 
America, the evil enemy from which Bush will save America. They become multipurpose 
rhetorical punching bags, which Bush can pound away at with verbal blows whenever he 
wants to reinforce his persona and bolster the ethical appeal he is making. For example, 
when the large surpluses Bush inherited turn into the largest budget deficits in history, 
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Bush slams an uppercut into the ~ - .. punching bag, naming the "war on terror" as a major 
reason for the deficits while never mentioning the large tax cuts. Bush takes advantage of 
this enemy in order to attempt to unite the country-but apparently he wants to unite it on 
the basis of his conservative ideology-not consensus. He uses alienation to divide off the 
Democrats and tries to force them, the minority party, to swallow more and more of his 
ideology; when they resist, he tries to intimidate them with charges that they are assisting 
the enemy and paints them, by implication, as unpatriotic and un-American (devil-terms) 
in a clear play for power and dominance on behalf of himself and his presidency. As 
Gronbeck's theory held in Chapter 2, much of national politics has been reduced to the 
moral and the patriotic. Bush tries to score political points on this basis. 
In his conclusion, Bush declares: 
[Regarding Afghanistan], we have no intention of imposing our culture. 
But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of 
human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for 
women; private property, free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. 
. . . We will see freedom's victory. 
Bush reels off a list of American ideographs, such as "the rule of law" and so forth 
in order to further cement his ethical appeal. And he adds in some poetic interest by 
personifying "freedom," another ideograph. These devices provide the best abstract cover 
words can buy. 
Twelve months later, Bush is back on Capitol Hill for another annual address to the 
Congress and the nation. 
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President Bush's State of the - Union - .. Address, January 28,2003 
The analysis of this speech is limited to only one of its topics: rhetoric involved in 
the run-up to the war in Iraq. The pivotal, underlying ideological and foreign policy 
revolution represented in this decision is the doctrine of "preemption": to strike a suspected 
enemy before he strikes the U.S., that is, to invade a country as a means to protect 
ourselves from their suspected plans and capabilities to harm us. The standard U.S. 
practice of unprovoked first attack hitherto had been limited to the rationale that we were 
protecting others, such as Reagan's invasion of Grenada and Bush 1's invasion of Panama. 
Moreover, not only has Iraq not attacked America, there is no evidence that she intends to, 
nor is she threatening her neighbors, nor is there any civil war in Iraq. This is a huge 
ideological as well as leadership gamble for the Bush administration but they think they 
have the power, including the rhetorical means, to pull it off. 
You and I serve our country in a time of great consequence. . . . Days of 
promise and days of reckoning. . . . In a whirlwind of change and hope and 
peril. . . . 
The gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing 
America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons 
for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those 
weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation. 
. . . Different threats require different strategies. . . . Iran . . . pursues 
weapons of mass destruction, and supports terror. . . . The North Korean 
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regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear. . . . Our nation and the 
world . . . must . . . not allow an even greater threat [than North Korea] to 
rise up in Iraq. 
. . . We will not deny, we will not ignore, we will not pass along our 
problems to other Congresses, to other presidents, and other generations. 
We will confront them with focus and clarity and courage. 
Not much analysis or commentary is needed for this part of Bush's speech. It is 
simply more of the same of the prior speech in terms of the one-two punch of inducing fear 
(pathos) with images of a very dark and imminently dangerous world while projecting 
Bush as a strong leader (ethos) who will deal with it (last paragraph). It is the same 
rhetorical strategy-but a new political or ideological target-Iraq and Saddam Hussein. 
[Saddam Hussein,] a brutal dictator . . . with ties to terrorism. . . . agreed 
to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. . . . systematically violated 
that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. . . . 
. . . The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently 
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence 
sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum 
tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. 
. . . Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda. 
. . . The dictator. . . used [WMDIon whole villages-leaving thousands 
of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. . . . torturing children while 
their parents are made to watch . . . Other methods used in the torture 
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chambers of Iraq;, electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on 
the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this 
is not evil, then evil has no meaning. 
With the most graphic language, Bush shovels pathos in spades, one gruesome 
characterization after another of Saddam Hussein. He defines Saddam Hussein with a 
variety of devil-terms (accurately by virtually all accounts). Examples include such words 
and phrases as: "brutal dictator," "used [WMD] on whole villages," "torturing children," 
and "evil." Bush places Saddam in the same caricature as Bin Laden; to an extent he makes 
Saddam the successor to Bin Laden as the evil enemy; and he connects Saddam to al- 
Qaeda and Bin Laden as collaborators in terrorism. Arguably, Bush makes Saddam a 
rhetorical scapegoat. But the semantics of these characterizations of both Bin Laden and 
Saddam are not of prime importance. What is important is that Bush, through the strategic 
use of rhetoric, chooses to name and blame Saddam as the worst enemy of America as a 
means to persuade Americans to support Bush's choice of war in Iraq. 
We will consult. . . . We seek peace. . . . If war is forced on us, we will 
fight in a just cause. . . . And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the 
full force and might of the United States military-and we will prevail 
(emphasis mine). 
. . . And we go forward with confidence. . . . Americans are a resolute 
people. . . . Adversity has revealed the character of our country. . . . 
America is a strong nation, and honorable in the use of our strength.. . . 
Bush shows good sense in his promise to consult at the U.N. before going to war 
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and by suggesting that he wants-peace and not war. But primarily he positions himself as a 
strong leader who is willing to take tough action to protect Americans from the evil 
dictator, who threatens them and forces Bush to choose to go to war to defend them. 
Forces? Yet another terministic screen that channels the audience's thinking into the 
thought pattern of "justified." And Bush follows it with the actual words, declaring the 
cause is "just." But this characterization begs the question: "just" according to whom? 
Brooks contends that she identified thirty-nine examples of empty language in this 
speech. An example she cites is that "the controversial plan to wage war on Iraq was 
simplified to: 'We will answer every danger and every enemy that threatens the American 
people"' (20). As Brooks indicates, this sentence is a strong-sounding, chest-thumping 
over-generalization that lacks any specific, concrete meaning. 
Unlike the generally moral ends and means of rhetoric that Bush put into service 
after 911 1 to communicate about and unite the nation for military action against al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan, I argue that Bush manipulates rhetoric to persuade the Congress and the 
citizenry to support his decision to launch the War in Iraq. It is conceivable, certainly, that 
the country may have backed the invasion of Iraq even without the misleading rhetoric. 
But by the time the war begins about two months later, Bush and his team have convinced 
most Americans that Saddam Hussein was behind the 911 1 terrorist attacks and that he 
possessed WMD poised to strike the U.S. The next State of the Union address shows a 
similar pattern. 
President Bush's State of the Union Address, January 20,2004 
Bush starts this speech with some ethos to conciliate the audience and then moves 
quickly to try to dispel doubts about the lingering war in Iraq. 
We've not come all this way-through tragedy, and trial and war-only to 
falter and leave our work unfinished. 
In contrast to his extensive use of "personalization" with the pronoun "I" in some 
previous speeches about the War in Iraq, here Bush adopts the inclusive "we." 
Nonetheless, he maintains an edge of leadership and authority when he incorporates an 
undertone of shaming the Congress and the country to not quit the war before it is finished. 
Of course, Congress compliantly authorized the war; he has them on a short leash and can 
yank their chain at will. But the American public did not participate in the go-to-war 
decision; Bush's challenge is to find rhetorical devices to keep them motivated to stay with 
him and continue to support his course in Iraq. 
Americans are rising to the tasks of history, and they expect the same from 
us. In their efforts, their enterprise, and their character, the American people 
are showing that the state of our union is confident and strong. 
To the previous point, Bush's speechwriters meld several clever devices in this 
excerpt as a means to shore up support. First, Bush implies that all Americans are rising up 
to the tasks of history, which he implies are represented in the War in Iraq. However, given 
that the country is split over the war, this implication overstates the case. But perhaps the 
grandiloquence of speech, the sense of vision, and the praise persuades some to question 
their opposition to the war. Second, Bush uses this exaggerated characterization of the 
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electorate as a stick to cajole the,Congress to hold fast on supporting the war and him as 
the war president. Third, Bush seems to indicate that he is just trying to measure up to the 
expectations of the American people. However, I believe it is valid to argue that Bush 
thinks he has risen to some grand task (and legacy) of history and that he is trying in this 
speech to cajole Americans to join him, to rise up to his expectations, and to continue to 
back the course of action that he chose for America in Iraq. Lastly, Bush tries to win 
support by heaping praise on Americans. Bottomline, Bush, as strong leader in the strict 
father role, as a dominator, defines for the Congress and the electorate the positions on the 
War in Iraq that he expects them to occupy as well as the type of behaviors that he expects 
them to exhibit in supporting his course of action. 
Some critics have said our duties in Iraq must be internationalized. . . . 
America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our 
country. 
In this quote, Bush frames what the U.S. is doing in Iraq as "our duties," a term that 
implies honor, responsibility, and the ideal of sacrifice for others while at the same time it 
screens out many other explanations that the audience might choose to apply to what 
America is doing in Iraq. Second, when Bush uses the term "permission slip," he is 
evoking the adult-child relationship of the strict father model for America's relationship 
with other nations, as Lakoff asserts in Don't Think of an Elephant!. Bush is really 
communicating much more than he literally states-which exemplifies the awesome power 
of frames to evoke a whole realm of meaning at the conceptual level as soon as the words 
hit the brains of the listeners. whether at the conscious or subconscious level. The full 
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meaning is that the U.S is not a_schoolchild that needs to get permission from the U.N. or 
from other nations because we are the adults, we are the schoolmaster, and metaphorically 
they, the U.N. and the other nations, are the schoolchildren. At home, Bush may have 
gained political advantage with some Americans from this talk of U.S. dominance and 
promotion of national self-interest as the world's sole superpower. 
Some . . . did not support the liberation of Iraq. . . . We're seeking all the 
facts. Already, the Kay Report identified dozens of weapons of mass 
destruction-related program activities. . . . Had we failed to act, the 
dictator's weapons of mass destruction programs would continue to this 
day. 
In this text, Bush attempts to redefine his way out of the box, created by the invalid 
rationale of WMD in Iraq. Regardless of whether he finds himself in the box 
unintentionally because of the failures in the intelligence agencies or placed himself there 
by intentional deception and hyping of WMD and the Saddam threat, he exerts rhetorical 
effort to salvage his persona of a trustworthy, moral leader. Thus he changes his earlier 
words, "weapons of mass destruction," the ones he used to describe the primary 
justification for the war in Iraq, to "weapons of mass-destruction programs," (emphasis 
added) and hopes that he can revise the rationale for the war to more favorable terms. 
Perhaps he thought this change of words, without acknowledging that the primary reason 
he cited for going to war was invalid, would solve the credibility issue it presents for him. 
But perhaps it would have the opposite effect. 
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To reiterate, Bush uses "e" and "their" instead of "I" and "my" much more 
extensively in this speech as he now finds it more advantageous to identify himself as one 
of many instead of one out in front of many, since many more Americans have begun to 
openly question his decision to go to war in Iraq. By "we" he means right-thinking, war- 
rallying, pro-American citizens, who, of course, are synonymous with those who back him; 
to be otherwise was to be shamefully un-American. 
We also hear doubts that democracy is a realistic goal for the greater Middle 
East. . . . I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to 
live in freedom. 
"Democracy" and "freedom" are American ideographs now to be exported to the 
Middle East. Further, if one does not have a strong argument, one can always invoke 
God's name and attribute a point of ideology to God, and the identification and shared 
values that it brings with the audience may still win support, at least with some of the 
religious base in the U.S. 
The momentum of freedom in our world is unmistakable-and it is not 
carried forward by our power alone. We can trust in that greater power who 
guides the unfolding of the years. And in all that is to come, we can know 
that His purposes are just and true. 
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In this comment, Bush borrows - .. a rhetorical technique from antiquity: the 
enthymeme3, which is another way to use rhetorical form and congruity theory to involve 
the audience in completing and assenting to a rhetor's unspoken proof. To illustrate, here is 
Bush's comment, which originally consisted of just two of three statements in a standard, 
three-part, classical syllogism, expanded to its full form: 
1. In all that is to come, we can know that God's purposes are just and 
true. [stated major premise] 
2. The momentum of freedom in our world.. .is not carried forward by our 
power alone. We can trust in that greater power who guides the 
unfolding of the years. [stated minor premise] 
3. My purposes are aligned with God's purposes and you can trust that 
they are just and true. [unstated conclusion] 
This is another clever, tactical use of ethos enhanced by the rhetorical form of an 
incomplete enthymeme that relies on the beliefs and values held by the audience. Bush's 
speechwriters tap directly into these beliefs and values as they invoke God and refer to Old 
Testament scripture that appeals to Christians and Jews. They embellish the appeal within 
this shortened form of language and logical proof to subtly associate Bush's purposes with 
God's purposes, and thus imply that to trust Bush is the same as to trust God. They meld 
According to Bizzell and Herzberg, an enthymeme is "a means of proof in an argument wherein the rhetor 
places together probable premises about human action in order to arrive at a probable conclusion. The form 
of an enthymeme is the same as that of a syllogism. Rhetors usually choose a widely held belief as the first or 
major premise, then apply the premise to the particular case about which they are arguing" (1631). Often, a 
premise or a conclusion is omitted because the audience will likely supply it (i.e., the "incomplete 
enthy meme"). 
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these elements into a constructed image that creates a more favorable impression of Bush 
and heightens the overall persuasive effect. What's more, by using this technique, the 
president avoids potentially boring the audience by explicitly stating each step in his 
argument and, further, by not explicitly stating the conclusion, he potentially avoids 
alienating those hearers who would disagree or even be offended by such a self-promoting 
conclusion. If challenged about the implications of this statement, his talking heads could 
parse the response and deny that Bush ever intended the conclusion stated in step 3 
above--even though it is as real to the audience members who perceive it as if he had said 
it verbatim. 
Bush's first term nears the end, and the end nears in the campaign for the second. 
Campaign speeches add a little more spice--or vice-as the next speech shows. 
President Bush's Campaign Speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, October 3 1, 2004 
A review of several Bush stump speeches in the 2004 presidential election 
campaign reveals a standard text with a few adaptive changes for each locality or region in 
which the speech is given. This speech, given in Cincinnati three days before the election, 
is representative of Bush's 2004 campaign speeches. 
Perhaps the most important reason of all to put me back into office is so 
that Laura will be the First Lady for four more years. 
I'm proud of my running mate, Dick Cheney. I admit it, he does not 
have the waviest hair in the race. You all will be happy to know I didn't pick 
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him because of his hairdo. I picked him because of his judgment, his 
experience. 
In the first paragraph above, Bush attempts to transfer the positive ethos of his 
wife, who had much higher favorability ratings, to himself while appealing to women 
voters. In the second, he makes a sly, indirect negative definition of his opponent, Senator 
John Kerry, when he implies that Democrats picked John Kerry for his nice hairdo 
(Kerry's hair style was a commonplace talking point among conservative media and 
bloggers at the time) while he (Bush) picked Dick Cheney for his judgment and 
experience. He wraps this hardball tactic in humor, so as to ameliorate the negative politics 
that it represents, which helps preserve his appearance of ethos. 
This election takes place in a time of great consequence. . . . America 
will need strong, determined, optimistic leadership, . . . I've learned 
firsthand how hard it is to send young men and women into battle. . . . I've 
been strengthened by my faith. . . . As Presidents from Lincoln to Roosevelt 
to Reagan so clearly demonstrated, a President must not shift with the wind. 
A President has to make tough decisions and stand by them. 
. . . The role of a President is to lead based on principle and conviction 
and conscience. . . . Sometimes I mangle the English language. . . . But . . . 
you know where I stand. . . . 
You cannot say that about my opponent. I think it's fair to say that 
consistency is not his strong suit. . . . My opponent looks at an issue and 
tries to take every side. . . . I pledged to lower taxes for American families. I 
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kept my word: .,.: By reforming our public schools. I kept my word. . . . I 
promised to keep that commitment and improve Medicare by adding 
prescription drug coverage. I kept my word. 
This excerpt overflows with the language of the ethical appeal as Bush stresses his 
persona of the strong, moral, trustworthy leader. For example he repeats "I kept my word" 
three times. He appeals to common heritage and attempts to build identification by 
insinuating himself as one among former esteemed presidents. He mentions his "faith" in 
order to appeal to Christians and other religious groups on the basis of identification and 
shared values. Even the "mangle the English language" phrase has tactical significance: to 
make Bush more appealing to the common man. Moreover, Bush gets double mileage from 
the image of ethos. It forms the backdrop against which Bush negatively defines his 
opponent, John Kerry, as inconsistent on the issues. Even if some in the electorate dislike 
him (Bush), he wants to make sure they like Kerry even less. 
We'll continue to improve life for our families by making health care 
more affordable and available. . . . In all we do to improve health care, we 
will make sure the medical decision are made by doctors and patients, not 
by officials in Washington D.C. 
. . . My opponent has a different approach . . . He's proposing a big- 
government health care plan. 
In this text, Bush uses terministic screens to persuade the electorate to believe that 
his health care approach preserves patient choice of doctors while Kerry's "big- 
government health care plan" would take that choice away from citizens. With Kerry, he 
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argues, big government in Washington would make those choices for them. The validity or 
invalidity of Bush's argument is not the point; the point is how he skillfully uses a 
rhetorical device to portray his case favorably and his opponents case unfavorably. 
On national TV, Senator Kerry said it would be irresponsible to vote against 
the troops. And then when the vote came around, he did the irresponsible 
thing and voted against the troops. And then he entered the flip-flop hall of 
fame by saying this-"I actually did vote for the $87 billion right before I 
voted against it. " 
Despite the problematic nature of Kerry's own statement, one could say that this is 
another Bush attempt to negatively define him by use of the term "flip-flop." 
As part of his conclusion, Bush says: 
These are historic times, and a lot is at stake in this election. . . . But 
ultimately, this election comes down to who can you trust-who can you 
trust to provide security for your family?. . . And if you are a voter who 
believes that the President of the United States should say what he means, 
and do what he says, and keep his word, I ask you to come stand with me. . . 
. In 2000 . . . I made this pledge: I said if I got elected I would uphold the 
honor and the dignity of the office to which I had been elected. With your 
help, with your hard work, I will do so for four more years. 
This excerpt from the closing is drenched in the languge of ethos, including more 
of the persona of the strong leader and protector, with words like "trust," "trust to provide 
security for your family," "say what he means.. .do what he says.. .keep his word," and 
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"uphold the honor and the dignity of the office." For most of four years Bush has projected 
the persona of a man of moral character, of trust, of honor, of principle, of a strong leader, 
of a national father and protector. He works that image hard with this audience, while he 
works equally hard to make his opponent's image unacceptable, just as his father did with 
Michael Dukakis in 1988. Obviously, the strategy of negative, dirty politics is not unique 
to Bush-although he pushes it further than some. The unanswered question is how Bush 
squares his dirty politics with his self-promoted persona of religiosity and moral character. 
Nonetheless, the strategy of positive language to construct his audience-adapted ethos and 
negative language to destruct his opponent's ethos would work for Bush again in the 
election of 2004. 
B. Bush Administration Communications 
Inquiry into the wider use of rhetoric in the Bush administration provides additional 
insights into how Bush constructs his rhetorical ethos. 
Corporate-Style Public Relations. First, Bush relies heavily on public relations 
tactics borrowed from corporate America. A public relations expert, Frank Luntz, CEO of 
The Luntz Research Companies, is one of the conservatives' main communications 
consultants. For the confidential use of conservatives only, Luntz develops and circulates 
playbooks in which he concisely explains for each major issue what the liberal reasoning 
is, what the conservative reasoning is, and how conservatives can best attack liberal 
perspectives. The playbooks also contain detailed language guidelines that spell out how 
conservatives should talk about all major issues, what words and phrases and slogans to 
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use as well as what not to use. Insight into one of Luntz's secret playbooks, circa 2004, can 
be gleaned from a twenty-page chapter dealing with the environment that was 
surreptitiously posted on the Internet for all to read. It details precisely how conservatives 
should frame the debate over global warming, arsenic in the water, smokestack pollution, 
and the like to their advantage-even though, as Luntz acknowledged, the science and the 
electorate increasingly were against them. "It's all in how you frame your argument . . . ," 
the Luntz playbook asserts (133). Conservatives have learned the techniques and 
developed the discipline to execute these linguistics-based public relations plays skillfully. 
Luntz's playbooks are masterpieces of talking points. They set forth what to say 
and what not to say, as well as the order in which to place certain statements and 
rationales. The chapter on the environment includes lists of "language that works" and 
"words that work." In another instance, it lists "The Nine Principles of Environmental 
Policy and Global Warming"-specific talking points for this issue. It does the same for 
environmental protection in general, under the heading or label of "A Cleaner, Safer, 
Healthier Future." For the latter, the playbook emphatically declares that the first step must 
embody this principle: ". . .any discussion of the environment has to be grounded in an 
efSort to reassure a skeptical public that you care about the environment for its own sake- 
that your intentions are strictly honorable." Another principle is: "The three words 
Americans are looking for in an environmental policy are 'safer,' 'cleaner,' and 
'healthier."' Another is: "Your plan must be put in terms of the future, not the past or 
present. . . . We are trying to make things even better for the future." A final one is: "two 
words that . . . Americans are expecting to hear from regulators and agencies are 
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'accountability' and 'responsibility."' - -. There is much more, but this suffices to capture the 
essence of the public relations strategy in the Luntz playbook. 
The Bush administration has taken many cues from this language-framed 
environment play and perfectly executed it as policy and in political communications. For 
instance, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) did an analysis in March 2005 
of how Bush's language promoting his energy policy in a speech in Columbus, Ohio, on 
March 9, 2005, which turned into legislation later that year, closely tracks the points and 
language in Luntz's playbook. In its report, "Energy Policy: President Bush Talks the Talk, 
Doesn't Walk the Walk," NRDC compares Luntz's language in one column and the 
corresponding Bush language from Bush's speech in a second, adjacent column. Following 
are three of the many points of comparison from this article: 
The Luntz play boils down to this: portray an ethos that you sincerely care about 
the environment, frame the debate with terministically-screened, empty words like "safer" 
and "cleaner," while shifting responsibility from the president by demanding that unnamed 
Luntz Memo 
The key principle is "responsible energy 
exploration." And remember, it's NOT 
drilling for oil. It's responsible energy 
exploration. 
Reject talk about "choosing between more 
energy and a cleaner environment." Assert 
clearly that "we have to do both." 
We need to say yes to a comprehensive, 
common sense energy policy for the 21 st 
Century. 
Bush Speech 
"To produce more energy at home, we need 
to open up new areas to environmentally 
responsible exploration for oil and natural 
gas, including the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge. . . . 
"Too many people in Washington and around 
our country seem to think we have to pick 
between energy production and 
environmental protection, between 
environmental protection and growing our 
economy. I think that's a false choice." 
"To meet America's energy needs in the 21st 
century, we need a comprehensive 
national energy policy." 
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"regulators" become more accountable, - and talk about the environment in terms of the 
future, which allows the administration to talk about a nice tomorrow while doing little to 
nothing today, or even relaxing regulations for the short term. 
This overall PR approach in the Bush administration includes employment of 
public relations professionals in most key departments of the federal government and 
orchestration of tight message control about issues based on written and rehearsed talking 
points, all coordinated by the White House. The distribution of the talking points is deep 
not only within the administration but also outside to party officials and opinion leaders in 
conservative media and think tanks. For example, in October 2005, in "Bush Addresses 
Miers' Critics," the Richmond Times-Dispatch contained the example of how Bush and 
Republicans planned to handle the disaffection with his nomination of Harriet Miers to the 
Supreme Court: 
Behind the scenes, Republican allies of the White House said they were 
trying to put together a public relations strategy to combat the mounting 
criticism over the Miers nomination. The effort, they said, would include 
administration officials, the Republican National Committee and 
conservative advocates who will carry onto television, talk radio and other 
forums, the message that Miers, the White House counsel and a close 
confidante of the president, is a strong choice and that Bush will stand 
firmly behind her. (A7) 
I suggest that the administration uses the combination of public relations and 
stifling message discipline in two tactical ways. First, they ofSensively manage the image of 
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the president and of the entire administration within exacting tolerances. The other is 
defensive. The best sword to pierce through a fabricated persona is truth, as in the writings 
of the former Czech president, Vhclav Havel, Living in Truth. Unlike a transparent, 
authentic ethos, to maintain a constructed ethos for the incumbent in a highly scrutinized 
role such as the presidency, as well as the public face of his administration, requires 
obsessive message loyalty and performative skill from all players, which shield the 
president and the administration from any damaging sword thrusts of truth as well as false 
charges. And it requires highly-paid public relations experts planted throughout the 
executive branch to ensure that everyone is singing from the same page of the same 
songbook in perfect unison and harmony as well as exhibiting preferred body language. 
Leveraging, the First Lady. Another interesting technique used many times by Bush 
and his strategists is the attempt to transfer the positive ethos of Laura Bush to her 
husband. They deployed the First Lady in this role many times in the 2004 campaign and 
have used her to raise sizable sums of money. But the most memorable example was when 
the First Lady took over the speaker role from Bush at the annual White House 
Correspondents' Association dinner on April 30, 2005. She gave a fabulous performance 
and delivered a string of one-liners, most of which roasted the President and top 
administration officials. It was obvious that this was not an impromptu affair-everything, 
literally everything, rhetorical is treated strategically in the Bush White House. Bush's 
favorability ratings needed a lift, and the First Lady, with much higher ratings, had a 
positive ethos that the political strategists itched to transfer to Bush in order to boost his 
image. Given the length and depth of her performance, the delivery of her one-liners was 
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obviously choreographed and rehearsed ahead of time and she was able to wittily roast the 
president and make him look more like a normal, softer, average guy instead of the 
inaccessible, arrogant, distant, hard-nosed war president, which has tended to turn off some 
of the electorate. Two days later, Elisabeth Bumiller wrote in The New York Times that 
Mrs. Bush's performance was practiced ahead of time in the White House Theater and that 
she had successfully softened and humanized the president's rough edges at a critical time 
of sagging poll numbers. (A19) 
The Tag Team. Another tactic of the administration is to have Bush deny a position 
or a rationale on an issue with vague or ambiguous language while another top 
administration official, most frequently Vice President Cheney, continues to verbalize an 
entirely different, even opposite, rhetorical position as a way to keep reinforcing a false 
belief among the American people. The two most repeated examples of this myth-making 
were Cheney's continued linkage of 911 1 to the war in Iraq by linking al-Qaeda to Saddam 
Hussein and second, his continued references to WMD in Iraq-even after the 911 1 
Commission concluded there was no 911 1-Iraq link and after the Kay Report concluded 
there were no WMD in Iraq. This tactic helps preserve the president's ethos of 
trustworthiness, while the vice president and other officials continue the rhetorical sleight- 
of-hand unabated. 
Misnomers. Lastly in regard to the rhetoric of the larger Bush administration, I 
raise the issue of how they take advantage of misnomers. Here are several examples: 
The label "Clear Skies Initiative" screens the audience to think of environmental 
action to improve air quality and visibility. But what the initiative actually did was to delay 
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and reduce the requirements then currently in place, taking the teeth out of them, which 
will dirty the skies. 
The label "The Patriot Act" screens the audience to think of citizen acts of 
patriotism or fidelity to country. But what this act did was to trade off certain civil 
liberties, for which patriots had given their lives over time in America, in order to make it 
easier for law enforcement officials to investigate terrorism. Maybe the trade-offs were 
properly balanced; maybe they were not. That is not the point. The point is that the label is 
a misleading terministic screen. 
The label "Smokestack Pollution Reduction Plan" implies action to reduce 
pollutants emitted into the air by power companies. But, according to the Clean the Air 
organization, it greatly weakens the previously passed bipartisan Clean Power and Clean 
Smokestacks Acts by significantly delaying phased in target dates and allowing much 
larger releases of pollutants like mercury, soot-forming sulfur dioxide, smog-forming 
nitrogen oxides, and heat-trapping carbon dioxide ("Bush Administration"). Again, this 
misnomer relies on a deceptive terministic screen. 
The label "Healthy Forests Initiative" engenders a warm and fuzzy image of 
taking care of America's extensive forests. According to an analysis by The Sierra Club, 
an environmental advocacy group, this program takes care of corporate logging companies 
at the expense of citizen-owned public lands ("Healthy"). 
Use of such misnomers purposely deploys the Burke-theorized device of terministic 
screens as a means to direct the American people's perceptions into specific, favorable 
channels while they simultaneously deflect our attention and thinking away from the 
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reality of what Bush and his ad-ministration are actually doing. This idea segues to the next 
section, "reality check." 
CHAPTER 4 
Evaluation: Reality Check 
The previous chapter primarily analyzes Bush's rhetoric: what he says and how he 
says it as a means to persuade Americans to his worldview, to his version of reality, to his 
policy propositions. In contrast, in Chapter 4,first, I trace a few of his major policy 
initiatives as well as his rhetorically constructed personae as they evolve over time in order 
to discover and analyze what Bush has actually done. Much of the reality and many of the 
anticipated outcomes of Bush's rhetorically-supported policy initiatives are easily inferred 
from the prior speech texts and analyses. Yet a few examples of outcomes help pinpoint 
the realitv as compared to the rhetoric. In other words, do the two square up? 
Second, within the context of the dynamic rhetorical situation, the audience, in this 
case the American people, provides the only meaningful reality check on the speaker's 
ethos and propositions. Do they believe and trust him or her? Does this trust lead them to 
embrace his or her views and propositions for making their lives better, happier, more 
prosperous, safer, and the like? In the last part of this section I gauge the American 
audience members' response to Bush's rhetoric and realities as they see them. 
A. Policy Outcomes 
Compassionate Conservatism 
Regarding the political jargon of "compassionate conservative," in an Associated 
Press story in 1999 posted on the CNN website, Senator Lamar Alexander, Republican 
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from Tennessee, who competed - -. against Bush in the Republican primary, accused Bush of 
using "weasel words" ("Bush Sounds"). Anthony Weston, in his A Rulebook for 
Arguments referenced earlier, spells out numerous techniques that persuaders use to make 
fallacious arguments as a way to mislead the audience. He includes "weasel words" in the 
list, which he defines as a technique for "changing the meaning of a word in the middle of 
your argument so that your conclusion can be maintained, though its meaning may have 
shifted radically" (78). I showed in Chapter 3 how Bush radically transformed the 
definition of "compassion" to mean or to fit his conservative-based ideology of 
responsibility. The questionable nature of exploiting the words "compassionate 
conservative" as weasel words is underscored in the same AP article when it reported that 
"former [Republican] Vice President Dan Quayle prohibited his staff from using them." 
Five years into the Bush presidency, the numbers of Americans living in poverty, 
without health insurance, without adequate medical care, without the means to afford home 
heating fuel, and without adequate housing have remained the same or increased. The gap 
between the rich and the poor has grown. For example, in "Income, Poverty, and Health 
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2004," the U.S. Census Bureau reports that the 
poverty level has steadily climbed every year from 2000 to 2004. Looking at 2004, 37 
million people were in poverty, up 1.1 million from 2003. Likewise, the poverty rate 
increased to 12.7 percent in 2004, up from 12.5 percent in 2003. Regarding Americans 
without health insurance, the Census Bureau reports that the uninsured rate has climbed 
from 14.2 percent in 2000 up to 15.7 percent in 2003, and remained at 15.7 percent in 
2004. 
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Although these are complex effects involving not only the federal government but 
also state and local governments, life has changed little for the scores of millions living at 
the bottom of the social and economic ladders, the ones who typically need the hand of 
compassion. 
That Bush himself recognized that compassionate conservatism was just a persona 
or label with a short-term political shelf-life is evidenced by the fact that he nearly dropped 
it from use about halfway through his first term and almost never mentioned it in the 2004 
election campaign. For example, in the October 3 1, 2004 campaign speech analyzed 
earlier, Bush never mentioned "compassionate conservative" once. Interestingly, when he 
resurrected the term after faring badly over his response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
late summer 2005, his use of the label did not yield any noticeable benefit, based on poll 
data, among Americans' perceptions of his handling of these disaster situations. 
No Child Left Behind 
Perhaps Bush's image of the abandoned child is matched by many of the states' 
image of an abandoned presidential commitment to fund the program mandated by this act. 
Present day state lawsuits and complaints against the federal government, as well as the 
decision of one heavily Republican state, Utah, to refuse to accept federal education 
funding in order not to implement the No Child Left Behind program, reflect the 
considerable and serious debate as to whether the tangible support for education in the 
Bush budget is equal to the volume of his rhetoric. 
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Social Securitv Lock-Boxing _ ., 
In his February 27,2001 address to Congress, Bush said he would not divert any of 
the $2.6 trillion Social Security surplus to other programs but save it for Social Security 
alone. However, the federal government had not "lock-boxed" Social Security's surplus 
funds for decades; instead it had issued government securities (1.O.U.s) and promptly used 
the funds for current fiscal budget needs. Even during the years of fiscal budget surpluses 
in the Clinton administration, the decision was made that it was more advantageous for 
long term fiscal management to use the annual Social Security surpluses to pay down the 
national debt instead of directly "lock-boxing" those funds for Social Security. 
Thus the $2.6 trillion Social Security surplus had long since been diverted and 
Bush did not have the budgetary means to redeem it in that single fiscal year. To size the 
situation, the largest budget surplus, which was $236 billion in the last year of the Clinton 
administration, was equal to only about 9 percent of the bond assets held in the Social 
Security trust fund (Office of Management and Budget). Bush's revenue and spending 
plans, coupled with a slowing economy, quickly wiped out the fiscal budget surplus and 
created the largest deficit in U.S. history. The Bush team was either incompetent regarding 
this aspect of Social Security or the promise to lockbox was an o~~tright falsehood intended 
to deceive the American people-neither of which, if known, would have contributed to a 
sense of viable ethos. 
Selling the 2001 Tax Cut 
A signature ideological success early in Bush's first term was passage of the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which provided a huge tax 
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cut, as he had promised in the campaign he would do. Of course, tax policy is fair game for 
political deliberation. The goal of this part of the analysis is to understand what Bush 
represented rhetorically about his plan in order to sell it as compared to what tax changes 
the plan itself actually specified. His rhetorical position was stated in the executive 
summary of his plan: 
These are the basic ideas that guide my tax policy: lower income taxes for 
all, with the greatest help for those most in need. Everyone who pays 
income taxes benefits-while the highest percentage tax cuts go to the 
lowest income Americans. (qtd. in Fritz et a1 75) 
A distributional effects analysis of the tax cuts, based on the assumption that the 
cuts are permanent, by Gale and Orszag of the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax 
Policy center4 determined that: 
Lower-income Americans received much smaller reductions in dollars and 
percentage of tax cuts than middle or high income taxpayers. 
For the lowest three income quintiles (60 percent or about 92 million 
taxpayers) the tax cut averaged about $400 a year. On a percentage basis, 
this large group's share of the total tax cut was 12 percent. 
In contrast, for the top 1 percent of taxpayers, the average tax cut was 
$56,000 annually. On a percentage basis, this very small group's share of 
the total tax cut was 30 percent. (website) 
The Center makes its analyses, including the one referenced here, using its Microsimulation Model. The 
time period of this analysis is 2010, which allows all of the varying implementation dates of different 
provisions in the tax-cut legislation to have become effective. 
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In Chapter 3, regardinglhe February 27,2001 speech, I show how Bush structured 
a rhetorical parity of concern for low-income and high-income taxpayers. When 60 percent 
of the taxpayers get 12 percent of the tax-cut dollars and 1 percent of the taxpayers get 30 
percent of the tax-cut dollars-where is the parity? And what happened to Bush's premise 
that "the highest percentage tax cuts go to the lowest income Americans?" 
In addition, Bush and his surrogates offered misleading, atypical examples, such as 
the famous waitresslsingle mom with two children, whom Bush said his plan would wipe 
her tax liability entirely, when it wouldn't, unless certain other unlikely circumstances in 
her situation occurred, according to an analysis titled "A Comprehensive Assessment of 
the Bush Administration's Record on Cutting Taxes" by Isaac Shapiro and Joel Friedman 
of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (website). Another unrepresentative example 
was the average "family of four" who would save $1,600. In a report titled "Final Version 
of Bush Tax Plan Keeps High-End Tax Cuts, Adds to Long-Term Cost," the Citizens for 
Tax Justice group found that 89.6 percent of all taxpayers would have received less than 
$1,600 ("Final Version"). The question is: would the 10.4 percent who would save $1,600 
be properly called "typical?" 
From Budget Surplus to Budget Deficit 
In the same speech, after he had addressed certain other budget priorities, Bush 
offered: "And then, when money is still left over, my plan returns it to the people who 
earned it in thefirst place. " For each of the nearly four years since taxes were cut, there 
has not been any money left over. As the result of revenue and spending levels, the 
government has run large budget deficits during this period. According to Table 1 of the 
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"Historical Budget Data" of theCongressiona1 Budget Office, for 2002-2004 combined, 
the deficits totaled nearly $1.5 trillion-although the Bush and predecessor administrations 
prefer to report the number net of Social Security fund surpluses, which in this case would 
reduce the total by about $500 billion or one-third. The CBO Table reflects that the deficits 
for 2003 and 2004 are the largest on record. 
Moreover, the budget deficits lead to a contested issue of whether the government 
has, in effect, borrowed the money that it gives to the current generations in the form of tax 
cuts. One surety, however, is that Bush pushed the tax-cut legislation through Congress, 
which reduced government revenues substantially. A second surety is that Bush shares 
accountability for the deficit spending during his terms, since he has signed into law every 
Congressional spending bill during his presidency-and vetoed none. A final surety is that 
the borrowed money will have to be repaid. Will the argument that the economic stimulus 
generated from the tax cuts will allow the country to "grow" its way out of its deficit 
budget position and repay all of the debt incurred during the deficit years become a reality? 
Or, will future generations, our children and grandchildren, have to pay the debt back, with 
interest, through their taxes? This very real budgetary and debt financing outcome was 
never broached in Bush's initial or subsequent tax-cut rhetoric. 
In the 2000 election campaign, Bush decried budget deficits. As president, in his 
February 27,2001 address to Congress, he warned against the "dangerous road to deficits" 
and declared that "we must take a different path." In this speech, he also argued that we 
had plenty of revenues to fund a tax cut and other priorities and to pay down an 
"unprecedented" amount of the national debt. But eight months later in October, 2001, 
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Bush was singing a different tune, as he realized that after his tax cuts, followed by 
increased military and homeland security spending after 911 1 and a slowing economy, the 
federal budget was heading into deficit. Interestingly, he stole the copyright of this "new" 
tune from A1 Gore. Here's what happened. 
Fritz et a1 document how in late 2001 Bush began to claim that he had said that 
there were three exceptions that justified not only running a federal budget deficit but also 
spending the entire Social Security surplus. They quote Bush's first statement of these 
exceptions, which he made at a meeting with business leaders in New York on October 3, 
200 1 : 
"Well, as I said in Chicago during the campaign, when asked about should 
the government ever deficit spend, I said only under these circumstances 
should government deficit spend: if there is a national emergency, if there is 
a recession, or if there's a war." (qtd. in Fritz et a1 267) 
The authors note that Bush "repeated this claim thirteen times over the next nine months 
and made several other more oblique references to it" (121 emphasis mine). They 
thoroughly document all thirteen quotes and other circuitous references in Appendix C of 
their book. 
The problem is, however, when the news media checked, there was no evidence 
that Bush ever made this comment in Chicago during the campaign. All of his speeches 
were readily available for easy fact-checking. Fritz et a1 relate that "the Washington Post 
eventually discovered that Vice President A1 Gore had proposed the exceptions back in 
1998." They add that "Bush finally stopped repeating the story, reportedly at the request of 
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his advisors who feared it was beginning to harm his reputation for honesty. . . ." (122). In 
this instance, Bush was caught in an outright fabrication that he used to try to explain away 
the burgeoning deficit that reflected poorly, at least in the eyes of many, on his tax cut 
initiative. 
Medicare Reform 
Another signature initiative that Bush touted was the Medicare prescription drug 
program he pushed through the Congress in 2003. In "Objections Grow Over Drug 
Benefit," a February 2005 article, the Richmond Times-Dispatch reported that the Bush 
administration estimated the cost at a hefty $400 billion over ten years. The wire report 
recounts that the resistance was great even among Republicans, especially in the House, 
where "leaders kept a roll call open for three hours so they could persuade skeptical 
lawmakers to vote yes." In February, 2005 the White House released new estimates 
showing the program would cost $724 billion-almost twice as much as originally stated. 
But here is the most troubling point from the article: 
According to a report by the Health and Human Services Department's 
inspector general, the administration's Medicare chief pressured a lower- 
ranking official to withhold the higher cost estimate from Congress [at the 
time of passage of the bill]. Richard Foster, Medicare's chief actuary, said 
administration officials threatened to fire him if he told Congress he 
expected the program could cost $500 billion to $600 billion. (Al+) 
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In other words, the Bush-administration falsified known data in order to persuade 
Congress to adopt its Medicare reform proposal, which Bush needed for the upcoming 
2004 election as a means to appeal to the large voting block of seniors. 
Revising the Rationale on Iraq 
On May 1,2003 the White House organized a flamboyant photo opportunity on the 
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, which featured President Bush flying from an 
airbase near San Diego in a SB-3 Viking jet and making a tailhook landing on the carrier 
deck with all the major news networks filming the whole affair. It was an image-making 
bonanza, with the President wearing a military flight suit and giving a victorious speech 
under a huge "Mission Accomplished banner as cheering naval personnel surrounded 
him. He declared that "'major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, 
the United States and our allies have prevailed."' It was a carefully and professionally 
staged show, designed for optimal visual impact, portraying the authority and aura of the 
Commander-in-Chief with his loyal troops in a victory celebration. Fritz et a1 describe how 
Scott Sforza, a former television producer working in the White House Office of 
Communications, led the team that coordinated the stage planning, which included the 
banner and the placement of colorfully dressed members of the Lincoln's crew behind 
Bush in order that they would provide the background for much of the film (Fritz et a1 
188). This image-making extravaganza provided Bush the ideal opportunity to burnish his 
ethos as charismatic war leader-hero. 
Soon, however, the script for the show would be changed, as the war in Iraq 
worsened and larger numbers of soldiers were dying than had before Bush's victory 
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celebration on the carrier. All af.the President's men and women began to parse what Bush 
had said, basically revising the meaning, now saying the mission was not yet 
accomplished. They began to disavow that the White House had anything to do with 
putting up the banner. Bush himself told reporters on October 28,2003 that the crew 
members on the carrier put it up-not his advance team-but later the very same day, as 
reporters continued to press the story, Press Secretary Scott McClellan parsed Bush's 
words and said the White House had produced the banner, but only at the request of the 
ship's crew, and the crew had put it up. As Fritz et a1 suggest, this was just the beginning 
of the "most aggressive spin campaign of his [Bush's] term" and it carried forward into 
rewriting several new drafts of the rationale for the war in Iraq (187-190). 
The Bush administration has transitioned through three different rationales of the 
war over time and the rhetorical techniques of redefinition or frame-shifting have been the 
means of choice for spinning the revision. Since this revisionism has been widely 
documented in numerous objective news accounts and books, I submit only a very brief 
recap. 
First, as covered earlier in this work, the war was originally sold to the Congress, 
the American people, the United Nations, and the world as an act of self-defense against 
weapons of mass destruction possessed by the evil regime of Saddam Hussein. When no 
WMD were found, Bush and his team tried to obfuscate, spin, and falsify the facts about 
the WMD situation in order to find an exit out of their box of original, whether intentional 
or unintentional, invalid claims. For example, a pair of truck trailers became the missing 
mobile biological production facilities, which was soon discredited by all but one member 
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of a team of fifteen experts from.the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Another example was Bush's attempt 
to redefine "weapons of mass destruction" as "weapons of mass destruction programs," as 
mentioned in the speech analysis in Chapter 3. Others instances included an effort to 
misrepresent the Kay Report, a claim that we had to go to war because Saddam would not 
allow the U.N. inspectors in (wrong-they were in Iraq until the day Bush announced the 
start of the war), and the ironic practice of accusing critics of revising history, which in fact 
the Bush team was doing. Regarding this last charge, in a June 16,2003 speech Bush 
claimed that "there are some who would like to rewrite history-revisionist historians is 
what I like to call them. Saddam Hussein was a threat to America and the free world. . . ." 
(qtd. in Fritz et a1 217). 
Nonetheless, when this strategy of deception, obfuscation, and rhetorical trickery 
would not hold water, Bush came up with his second rationale for the war in Iraq: it was 
the "central front" or front line in the war on terror, the familiar "better there than here" 
line. In a September 23, 2003, address to the United Nations, Bush stated: 
We are conducting precision raids against terrorists and holdouts of the 
former regime. These killers are at war with the Iraqi people. They have 
made Iraq the central front in the war on terror and they will be defeated. 
(qtd. in Fritz et a1 2 14) 
All of the Bush administration and conservative talking heads began to use this 
new talking point regarding Iraq. By this time, Bush and his political strategists had 
accorded full scapegoat status to Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, and the war on 
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terror. The devil-words, the terms of repulsion, were multiplying against these enemies and 
the administration continued to link Saddam and al-Qaeda and 911 1. The rhetorical 
punching bags were taking ferocious blows, deflecting attention away from the 
administration's problems. Cheney and others put on a full-court press to conflate the war 
in Iraq with the war in Afghanistan, because the latter was widely popular among 
Americans. 
As more time passed and the Iraq war continued with limited progress, Bush went 
to the well of redefinition again. Concurrent with the start of his second term, Bush 
introduced his third rationale for the war: the U.S. is bringing freedom and democracy to 
Iraq. He laid the groundwork in his second-term inaugural speech on January 21,2005, 
when he declared: 
The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the 
world. . . . So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and 
culture. . . . 
In this speech, Bush used the word freedom twenty-seven times and its relative, 
liberty, fifteen times, while he never mentions the words terror or terrorism, his former 
routine staples. By employing the word "freedom," Bush not only communicates in 
abstract, indefinite terms but he also taps into one of the most sacred and deep-seated 
American ideographs that can be used as a means of identification and ethical appeal. 
Glenn Smith argues that through a technique often used by propagandists, repetition, Bush 
tries to break down the will of the electorate to resist this minimally useful message (37). 
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The author quotes foreign policy, journalist Peter Slevin who observes that "Bush's real 
rhetorical goal is to present himself as the very image of freedom. Oppose Bush and you 
oppose freedom, albeit a warm and fuzzy definition of freedom" (qtd. in Glenn Smith 35- 
36). Thus Bush dons the persona of "liberator," adding to his repertoire of masks. 
In the vein of Burke's and Weaver's hypotheses of the hierarchy of terms, Bush 
and his team took, first, the entire U.S. foreign policy and recast it by moving it up the 
hierarchy of terms, attempting to associate it with what Burke called "the ultimate term" (A 
Rhetoric of Motives 189). In this case, Bush et a1 landed on "freedom," and to a lesser 
extent, "democracy," as the ultimate terms. After having announced this major premise in 
his second inaugural speech, this grounding of the nation's foreign policy in a Wilsonian 
worldview of spreading freedom and democracy, then they move on to the minor premise: 
grounding the rationale for the War in Iraq in the same ultimate terms. 
Recasting of the War in Iraq takes place about two week later in the February 2, 
2005, State of the Union address, in which Bush ties it up in a nice, tidy rhetorical 
package: 
We are standing for the freedom of our Iraqi friends, and freedom in Iraq 
will make America safer for generations to come. . . . We are in Iraq to 
achieve a result: A country that is democratic, representative of all its 
people, at peace with its neighbors, and able to defend itself. (White House 
website) 
Bush and his strategists seem to have pulled together diverse policy elements, 
realities on the ground in Iraq, growing discontent with Bush's rationale for and conduct of 
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the war, a recognition that terraism alone could not provide a satisfactory overarching 
framework for foreign policy, especially in Iraq, and second-term legacy objectives-and 
rolled all the goals into the big abstract cocoon of freedom and democracy-trying to strike 
as many responsive chords as possible in the American audience with these most basic 
ideographs and at same time make it very difficult for critics to attack him because these 
shared values are both closely held and highly nebulous. This is not to say that he totally 
abandoned his second rationale of Iraq as the front line in the war on terror. He maintained 
it, too, but now he screened it terministically in the larger ideographical context of freedom. 
What American could argue against freedom? Against democracy? If one 
attempted to, she would find it a very slippery rhetorical slope to mount. This focus on 
freedom created a better defensive position from which the Bush team could fend off 
charges of deception and hyping the case for war, allegations of incompetence in the 
conduct of the war, and concerns about rising death counts of American soldiers (over 
2,100) and Iraqi civilians (estimate of 25,000-100,000: the Bush administration has made it 
extremely difficult to estimate Iraqi casualties) as well as a $250 billion price tag that is 
climbing by $4-$5 billion a month-with no honorable end clearly in sight-and much of 
the world community of nations alienated from the U.S. 
These examples of actual outcomes raise serious questions about how Bush and his 
team have manipulated rhetoric, when politically expedient, to muddy the focus of reality 
for the public while pursuing their own political and ideological goals with a very clear 
focus. To this point, Ron Suskind, writing in the October 17, 2004 issue of The New York 
Times Magazine in an article titled "Without a Doubt," tells of an interesting encounter he 
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had with a senior Bush adviser in the summer of 2002. Suskind had written an article in 
Esquire about Bush's communications director, Karen Hughes, and the senior adviser was 
dispatched to tell Suskind that the White House did not like what he had written. However, 
what most startled Suskind was that 
the aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based 
community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge 
from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured 
something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. 
"That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're 
an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you're studying that reality --judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, 
creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things 
will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to 
just study what we do." (website) 
Suskind goes on to relate how many top principals in all parts of the administration 
and the military confirmed to him that Bush, acting primarily on his version of faith as well 
as his instincts while intentionally eschewing virtually all hard analysis, believes that 
taking decisive, gut-based action and being resolute is all that really counts. It follows that, 
for public consumption, rhetoric becomes the tool of choice used to create and maintain a 
faqade of favorable reality as well as the persona of confidence and certitude to back it up. 
When critics disagree, such as those who charge that Bush's rhetoric misrepresents 
many aspects of the reality of the War in Iraq, the Bush team often responds with furious 
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rhetorical assaults that overwhelmingly imply, while not using the precise word, that these 
critics are unpatriotic. They typically employ the tactic of saying that critics are helping the 
enemy and hurting not only soldier morale but the ability of the armed forces to 
successfully wage the war. There may be an element of truth in these charges; nonetheless, 
America is a democracy and dissent over war should be expected by any competent 
American leader who decides to wage it. And when nearly two-thirds of the electorate has 
come to view the war as a mistake, as now, a leader may find it doubly difficult to 
maintain the rhetorical position that critics are unpatriotic. On the other hand, however, 
American respect for and support of our soldiers at war constitutes one of the strongest 
held values in the public consciousness-which provides a wedge that Bush now turns to 
repeatedly with positive rhetoric to strengthen his ethos and negative rhetoric to weaken 
his critics' ethos. 
B. American Audience-The Judges 
Ultimately, the only reality check that counts is the one the audience makes based 
on how it assesses the rhetor and his diagnosis of reality as well as his solutions for dealing 
with it. Regardless of how skillfully a speaker constructs an ethos, the audience members 
are the sole judges. They assess what the speaker's ethos is, what it means to them, and 
whether it is credible. In the final analysis, they decide who to believe, what to believe, and 
what propositions to embrace or reject. 
President Bush has enjoyed generally good "favorability" poll ratings-reaching 
nearly 80 percent after 911 1-as well as relatively high "strong-leader" and "honesty" 
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ratings for most of his presidency, which have afforded him the national support among the 
electorate to motivate Congress to pass several of his signature legislative proposals. With 
the support or acquiescence of the Congress, he has led the country to war in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. By most indications, his rhetoric and his outcomes played well with the majority 
of Americans through his first term and into the second, although his ratings declined to 
the low 50 percent range in 2004 and the first half of 2005, according to Ipsos polls 
("President"). 
However, beginning in late summer 2005 the president has experienced a major 
reversal in public opinion. The downward trend was initiated with the lingering, nearly 
static war in Iraq, in which the number of U.S. casualties climbed above 2,000. Then, in 
the natural disaster caused by Katrina, Bush failed to maintain or promote his ethos as a 
sincere, strong leader and came under significant criticism. According to polling by Ipsos, 
Bush's favorability ratings in late summer and fall 2005 declined to between 35 to 40 
percent, the lowest of his administration ("President7'). The public is now openly 
questioning Bush's leadership and less than a third of Americans are satisfied with the way 
things are going in the nation, according to an APIIpsos poll ("Key"). Even his most 
erstwhile poll factor, "strong-leader," has declined significantly to less than 50 percent, 
according to a CBS poll ("Bush Ratings"). 
Why? What has caused Bush's support to erode? What factors have driven this 
change in perceptions by the American audience? For one, the opposition seems to have 
coalesced more and sharpened its rhetoric. But, in addition, Congressmen and politicians 
of both parties who have previously sat silent are finding voice, asking tougher questions, 
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and demanding answers. Forexample, on October 5, 2005 the Senate defied the White 
House and voted 90-9 to set new limits on interrogation and treatment of all detainees in 
U.S. custody ("Detainee"). And on November 14th, by a 79-19 vote the Senate approved a 
resolution calling for 2006 to be a year of "significant transition" in which Iraqis would 
take the lead in their security and conditions would be created for the phased departure of 
American forces. The Senators also requested quarterly reporting on progress in Iraq from 
the executive branch ("Congress"). 
Among the general public, polls show that a majority have begun to doubt Bush's 
genuineness, competence, and trustworthiness, that is, his ethos. For example, while Bush 
insists that the War in Iraq is making Americans safer from terrorism, 68 percent of 
Americans disagree ("CBS"). In addition, the aftermaths of hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
revealed that the Bush administration has made little progress in the four years since 9/11 
to prepare the homeland for dealing with a potential disaster caused by a major terrorist 
attack. Substantiating this claim, in early December 2005 the Richmond Times-Dispatch 
reported in "U.S. Urged to Focus More on Security" that as the bipartisan members of the 
9/11 Commission prepared to disband, they "conclude[d] that the government deserves 
'more F's than A's' in responding to their 41 suggested changes" in the Commission's 
report issued a year and a half earlier in July 2004 (A5). In addition, many perceive that the 
combination of cronyism in filling top positions in FEMA and the larger Department of 
Homeland Security coupled with ill-advised or ill-executed organizational changes may 
have actually lessened capabilities. 
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Meanwhile, resources are continually expended overseas where returns are in 
doubt. The same polls peg approval of Bush's handling of Iraq at about 38 to 40 percent 
and only about a third of Americans think the war in Iraq was worth the loss of American 
life and the other costs ("Americans"). Thus, aside from the sizable up-tick in the public's 
questioning of Bush's rhetoric versus observable reality, many have come to disdain 
several of the actual realities Bush has directly brought on the country, or which he has 
allowed by default under his presidency, from war to deficits to failure to act on illegal 
immigration. Hence trust is eroding. An AP-Ipsos poll in early August 2005 showed that 
slightly less than half of Americans think Bush is honest ("Americans"). From Bush's 
perspective, it is one thing to have the country split down the middle over some policy 
issue, such as abortion, but it is an entirely different level of meaning and impact to have 
half the country believing that you, the president, are dishonest and cannot be trusted. This 
outcome makes ethos-maintenance much more challenging for the president. 
Accusations of deception are growing louder and some question whether Bush lied 
to the country. The research I have cited shows that on some very important policy 
initiatives Bush has used deceptive rhetoric to mislead the country for his and his party's 
political advantage. In one case, the tale he made up about deficit spending exceptions, he 
repeated an outright falsehood several times over in order to cover his political backside. 
Did he lie about the case for war in Iraq? The answer depends on "what he knew 
when" about intelligence on WMD in Iraq. Did he believe there were WMD in Iraq until 
American forces found there were none? Or, as the Downing Street intelligence memo out 
of Britain explicitly states, did the Bush administration fix the intelligence around the 
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many-year-standing, well-docu-mented neoconservative goal to take out Saddam and 
convert Iraq to a U.S. satellite? Or did he, as Bob Woodward argues in Plan of Attack, 
commit such huge resources to the prewar buildup in the Mid-East and give such strong 
assurances to friendly, supportive nations in the region and to so many supportive, 
clandestine groups in Iraq that the war was coming-before going to Congress-before 
going to the U.N.-that he believed he had reached the point of no return, that is, he had to 
pull the trigger on the gun that he had loaded, cocked, and pointed at Iraq (344)? Only 
Bush and a few close advisers know the truth. In addition to concerns about deception in 
making the case for war, charges are flying that they hyped the case or knowingly made 
inaccurate statements to help persuade the country to embrace the war. For example, some 
fault Bush, Cheney, and others in the administration for deliberately and repeatedly linking 
Saddam Hussein to al-Qaeda and 911 1 as a rhetorical device to gain support for the war, 
when there has never been any factual connection established between Hussein and 911 1. 
When one finds oneself in a hole, the first rule is to stop digging. For example, after 
the Iran-Contra scandal unfolded on the public in the 1980s, President Reagan gave a 
speech to the nation and admitted mistakes and took responsibility for them, which 
allowed his administration to move largely on past the problem. However, as of the date of 
this writing, Bush's refusal of this option has led to a growing negative result. The sharp 
downturn in public opinion indicates that a majority of the American people see key 
realities differently than the picture Bush paints with his brushstrokes of rhetoric. 
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
The theory and practice of the ethical appeal as a means of persuasion in all manner 
of rhetorical situations has evolved during the 2,500-year rhetorical tradition but its 
importance has only expanded in the contemporary world. The last fifty years, sometimes 
characterized as the age of the rhetoric of manipulation, have witnessed an explosion of 
knowledge and practice of motivational psychology, public relations, and mass advertising 
as well as the prevalent use of the visual image. These developments have provided 
additional means for persuaders of all types-individual, corporate, institutional, and 
political-to manipulate the rhetorical situation for their advantage, should they choose 
such ends and means. In today's world, the speakerlleaderlseller often focuses on searching 
for effective stimuli and creating a desired image, whether for influence, profit, partisan 
ideological goals, or altruistic ends. In these postmodern rhetorical situations, with widely 
dispersed mass audiences, persuaders consistently tap ethos, the ethical appeal, in order to 
portray credibility and trust for themselves and their organizations as they engage in the 
practice of selling products, ideas, cultural values, political ideologies and the like. 
Perhaps no where are these factors-reliance on the ethical appeal, extensive image 
management, and pressure to manipulate the audience-more applicable than in the realm 
of political rhetoric. This is not to totally discount the persuasive appeals of pathos and 
138 
logos, but generally they perfom a lesser role in deliberative rhetoric, with some notable 
exceptions. As present-day politicians and elected officials in this increasingly complex 
world wrestle with ideological directions and policy issues about which exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are frequently divided, generally persuasion has been ratcheted 
down to the ethos-based appeal of character, family and moral values, and patriotism. 
Looking at the applied case, why has George Bush been successful as president, at 
least until very recently? A major cause, perhaps the determining factor, behind Bush's 
success has been a series of rhetorical strategies. First, in his extensive speaking, often 
before groups containing only carefully preselected participants, Bush consistently 
conciliates and appeals to the American audience as a whole and microsegments within it 
by extolling American ideographs, shared values, collective heritage, and commonplace 
assumptions that build identification and affinity at a very abstract, conceptual level, which 
is basically hollow language that does not commit him to anything concrete and also 
provides cover for his ideological agenda. Coupled with this broad appeal on the basis of 
identification, he effectively exudes the appearance of both goodwill toward the audience 
and sincerity about whatever topic he is addressing. Second, the White House has 
successfully constructed an ethos of Bush as man of character, moral values, and strong 
leadership. Even when his behavior and actions do not reflect these ideals, he and his team 
exploit rhetoric in order to sustain the image. Their key channel for this image 
management is the unparalleled media coverage that accrues to the president, which the 
Bush administration has adroitly optimized through its strategic communications and 
tightly-controlled public relations. Third, after 911 1, taking advantage of the nation's raw 
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emotional edge from these life-shaking terrorist attacks, the Bush team augmented the first 
two strategies with a one-two punch of the pathos of fear and the ethos of a strong war 
president who alone knew how to deliver the country from the forces of evil in this 
dangerous world that they sketched so darkly and negatively. Further, they leveraged the 
persona of the war president to secure additional political capital in the domestic arena. 
To tactically implement these strategies, the Bush White House deploys the full 
spectrum of rhetorical devices. The speechwriters and political strategists are accomplished 
practitioners of rhetoric and they, along with an entrenched, well-funded network of 
conservative intellectuals, public relations professionals, and strategically placed opinion 
leaders in the news media, deliver superior communications products consistently and 
uniformly to the public. They have even propagandized through government offices, such 
as the well-documented payments to media executives to air favorable administration- 
produced "news stories." With revelation in late fall 2005 of payments to Iraqi news media 
to run U.S. Defense Department-produced news stories without identifying the source, the 
Bush administration has extended the covert propaganda to the nation of Iraq. 
Although they expertly exploit all manner of rhetorical capabilities, the mastery of 
the terministic screen or language frame is perhaps their crowning achievement. Through 
these devices of language, they have expertly controlled the terms of debate in their favor. 
As a result, they have attracted conservatives, a sizable portion of independents, and some 
centrist Democrats with their well-tuned ethical appeal of moral and family values and by 
exploiting the appeal to patriotism with real as well as the rhetorically-constructed 
elements of the war presidency. For example, in the 2004 election, a sizable number of 
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Catholics, who tend to vote for-Democrats, crossed over to vote for Bush. Through its 
effective execution of these rhetorical strategies and tactics, the Bush White House has 
persuaded sufficient numbers of Americans to elect and support the president, at least until 
recently, even though he has consistently pursued the conservative ideological agenda of 
the right and generally resisted consensus-making in the political center. On major 
domestic issues, he has moved close to the center only on education and Medicare. Even 
then, he has approached these initiatives primarily on his terms. On the latter, his 
conservative constituents resisted, but Bush's strategists knew he must calibrate his appeal 
to unite at least sufficient numbers of seniors and others in the electorate to form a 
reelection majority. Granted, Americans' perceptions of the weak alternatives offered by 
the opposition may have afforded Bush extra maneuverability. 
Although Bush heads a White House that skillfully employs highly sophisticated 
rhetoric, the downside is that they have shown little aversion to crossing the line of ethics 
by relying on manipulation and deception when politically expedient. Accordingly, I 
suggest that Bush's rhetoric is molded largely by Aristotelian pragmatism, which embraces 
the concept of the ends-justify-the-means, as opposed to Quintilian's model orator who 
puts fidelity to ethics first. 
Following a relatively successful first term, more recently Bush has experienced a 
major reversal in public support. In Chapter 2, I noted how Connors and Corbett call the 
ethical appeal the "hidden persuader," given its contemporary flavor of image 
management, public relations, advertising, and the like. And so it is. But Bush has made 
overt ethical appeals the centerpiece of his persuasion, especially based on an ethos of 
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character and moral values as well as competence. However, in the context of a 
democracy, persuasion that relies heavily on an ethos constructed through language and 
images can be fragile; it may entail higher risk. Once the facade of ethos comes under 
scrutiny and starts to erode, the fall from grace may be faster and deeper than where 
consensus has been built through a compelling, factual case and candid debate. Once lost, 
personal trust is very difficult to regain. Moreover, once the electorate concludes that the 
public trust has been betrayed, the option of recovery may be off the table. The populace 
may allow spin, half-truths, deceit, and the like as typical "political hardball," but most 
will not accept betrayal of the public trust by any political leader. Only the umpires, 
Americans themselves, however, can determine what is in play and what is foul. For 
example, Bill Clinton had his own ethos problems because of personal scandal and public 
deceit, but he maintained public support because the citizenry apparently liked his 
governing approach and outcomes-his governing success relied more on competence and 
less on personal, character-based ethos, more on governing in the center and less on 
ideology at the extreme. 
While Bush is presently facing the situation in which a majority of the electorate is 
feeling a sense of generalized loss of trust and confidence, the real specter that haunts him 
is that these perceptions could dip further to the more dire evaluation-betrayal of the 
public trust. His challenge, along with his administration, is to search for and execute 
meaningful new strategies and tactics that would help restore his ethos. Of course, Bush 
can count on his core supporters on the right who will stand behind him virtually no matter 
what the results-about a third of the electorate. But in terms of the majority, he skates on 
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the thin ice of grudging support that melts away at the edges into alienation under the heat 
of a skeptical, even cynical, populace. Now in early December 2005, as I finish this 
writing, Bush has embarked on a campaign-style speaking schedule as a way to shore up 
support. In his speeches, he emphasizes that he has a sound plan for the war in Iraq while 
accentuating the positives he sees in the economy. As a result, he has received a bounce of 
3-5 percentage points in the polls. 
In the enduring debate about whether rhetoric is moral, immoral or amoral, Bush's 
rhetoric provides plenty of evidence for the prosecution that rhetoric must be, by its very 
nature, manipulative, and therefore immoral. Indeed, rhetoric has been abused in the 
political field to the point that in contemporary usage it is customary for commentators and 
news people to refer to most political statements as "rhetoric," assigning to this valuable 
art a very negative connotation. I contend, however, that it is not "rhetoric" that should 
bear the negative stigma but the politicians, including Bush, who manipulate rhetoric for 
political advantage and ignore the democratic principle of educating the electorate. I hold 
that political rhetoric can be employed ethically to great benefit of the governed-if the 
elected official's persuasion embodies ethical as well as democratic ends and means. 
Historian Eric Alterman in When President's Lie chronicles the lies and deceptions, 
put forth through the vehicle of carefully crafted rhetoric, of presidents Franklin Roosevelt 
and Harry Truman regarding the outcome of the Yalta Conference; John Kennedy and the 
Cuban missile crisis; Lyndon Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin incidents; and Ronald 
Reagan and the Central America and Iran-Contra scandal. In the concluding chapter, 
"George W. Bush and the Post-Truth Presidency," he likens Bush's rhetoric around the 
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War in Iraq to "the same manufactured atmosphere of crisis [fostered by] President 
Johnson during the period when Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 
1964" (302). Alterman asks the question: "Why do American Presidents [Democrats and 
Republicans] feel compelled to deceive Congress, the media, and their country about their 
most significant decisions?" (306) He answers that they rely on deception "largely for 
reasons of political convenience." He concludes that "the result, more often than not, is 
that when deals must be struck and compromises made on behalf of large purposes, 
presidents tend to prefer deception over education" (307). 
When a president fails to level with the citizenry, both the country and the 
individual president are harmed, Alterman argues. Bush and his administration are no 
exception. Polls show that the majority of the public no longer buys all or even most of 
Bush's constructed ethos, although Bush and his team may believe their own rhetoric. The 
rhetorically constructed Bush White House is developing serious cracks and faults in not 
only its edifice of policy outcomes but also its foundation of basic ethics. Aside from the 
topics raised in this work, serious charges of torture, rendition of prisoners, outing CIA 
agent Valerie Plame, and other illegal or unethical actions dominate the headlines. 
When considered in terms of any independent, transparent, honest assessment, it 
seems that Bush's ethos, buttressed by clever language and image management, can no 
longer bear the weight he would have it support on behalf of his administration's agenda. 
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